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The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain
in Intellectual Property Law*
by
A. SAMUEL ODDI**

I. Introduction
While the public domain is a pervasive concept in intellectual
property law, it is hardly a robust one. Surprisingly little attention has
been given to the public domain in the statutes establishing and
regulating intellectual property,1 in the case law interpreting these
*

This title finds its stimulus from two well known articles: (1) Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968): “The rational herdsman
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his
herd. And another; and another . . . that this is the conclusion reached each and every
rational herdsman sharing a common theory and is a tragedy. Each man is locked into a
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited.
Ruined is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest
in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings
ruin to all.” (2) Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property. 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 781 (1986): “Our law consistently
allocates that access to the public, because public access to those locations is as important
as the general privatization of property in other spheres of our law. In the absence of the
socializing activities that take place on “inherently public property,” the public is a
shapeless mob, whose members neither trade nor converse nor play, but only fight, in a
setting where life is, in Hobbes’ all too famous phrase, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.” Professor Rose defines those types of public property (jus publicum) that she
considers to be “inherently public property.” Additional stimulus from the other side of
the coin may be found in Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998) (“When
there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to under
use.”) and Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
**
Giles Sutherland Rich, Professor in Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of
Law. I would like to thank Professor Francois Curchod for his thoughtful comments on
the manuscript of this article, particularly with respect to the clarification of terminology.
I would also like to acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by Dr. Donald
Schelling, as well as the valuable assistance provided by Dr. Lorys Fuge Oddi (my wife) in
synthesizing neurophysiological research as it relates to cognitive processes (in particular
notes 31-42 and accompanying text) and her valiant efforts to explain this to me.
1. The Copyright/Patent clause of the Constitution grants Congress the positive
1
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statutes or concerning the common law of intellectual property,2 or in
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.8. While this clause makes no explicit reference to
“public domain,” the concept of public domain is, at least, implicit in the requirement of
“originality” to be an “author” or an “inventor”. See, e.g.,Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890
(1971): “An author’s ‘Writing’ or an inventor’s ‘Discovery’ can, in the constitutional sense,
only extend to that which is his own. It may not be broadened to include matters within
the public domain.” Even though copyright and patent statutes date from the First
Congress in 1790, the term “public domain” has not appeared in the various patent
statutes and has only recently made its appearance in the copyright statute (17 U.S.C.A. §
101 et seq.) by the addition of § 104A (Copyright in Restored Works) to comply with the
World Trade Organization Agreements as implemented by the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act. See 33 I. L. M. J. 1 (1994). No definition of “public domain” is provided,
although “public domain” appears in the definition of “restored copyright.” The term
“public domain” does not appear in the Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), (15
U.S.C.A §§ 1151-1127 (§§ 1-46)) or in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (West 2002),
reprinted in SELECTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION STATUES, REGULATIONS, & TREATIES 626-629 (Roger E.
Schechter, ed. 2000). Copyright Office Regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 201.26(b)(3), define
“public domain computer software” as “software which has been publicly distributed with
an explicit disclaimer of copyright protection by the copyright owner.”
2. The first Supreme Court case to mention “public domain” in the context of
intellectual property was Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). With
respect to the sewing machine previously covered by patents, the Court stated:
It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It
follows, as a matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there
passes to the public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was
constructed during the patent.
Id. at 185. The Court asked the question: “But at the expiration of the patent, does the
designation fall into the public domain with the patented invention?” Id. at 196. The
answer given was: “That where, during the life of a monopoly created by a patent, a
name, whether it be arbitrary or be that or the inventor, has become, by this consent,
either express or tacit, the identifying and generic name of the thing patented, this name
passes to the public with the cessation of the monopoly which the patent created.” Id. at
199. The Court, however, made clear that the designation [Singer] could not be used to
confuse consumers as to the source of the sewing machine. This ruling was re-affirmed in
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938), where the “patented
machines used were designed only to produce the pillow-shaped biscuits” and the
designation “shredded wheat” was the generic designation of the product. In Scott Paper
Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 263 (1945), the Court made the perhaps obvious
but important point: “A machine that is not patentable because it is not novel is just as
much part of the public domain as a machine on which the patent has expired.” This point
was reinforced in the context of attempting to protect unpatented products under state
unfair competition law in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964),
where the Court stated: “An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has
expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”
This conclusion is tied into the Copyright/Patent Clause in the companion case to Sears,
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964): “To forbid copying
under State unfair competition law would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I,
§ 8, cl.8 of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free
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the scholarly literature,3 at least until recently.4 Public domain would
access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.”
In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), the Court indicated the constitutional
limitations on Congress that it could not grant perpetual patents nor could it “authorize
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.” In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653 (1969) the Court overturned the contract doctrine of licensee estoppel and
permitted a licensee to challenge the validity of licensed patents. The Court found a
strong federal policy, concluding that “enforcing this contractual provision would
undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public
domain.” Id. at 674. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-481 (1974),
the Court reviewed the purposes of the federal patent system. These purposes are
succinctly restated in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979): “First,
patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of
inventions, to simulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the
invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection
seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”
In Kewanee the court held that state protection of trade secrets, including patentable trade
secrets, did not violate these policies. 416 U.S. at 493. In Aronson, the Court sustained a
contract that required continued payment of royalties on a key ring design that was
unpatentable. The Court concluded: “Enforcement of the agreement does not withdraw
any idea from the public domain” and stated that the public, if not the licensee, was free to
use the design at the time “the design entered the public domain as a result of the
manufacture and sale of the keyholders under the contract.” 440 U.S. at 263. In Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), the Court struck down a
Florida statute that prohibited the copying of unpatented boat hulls using a “direct
molding process,” which was also unpatented and also the most efficient method of
making the copy. Of relevance here, the Court stated that “the ultimate goal of the patent
system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through
disclosure.” Id. at 151. Even though Congress reversed this decision and extended
national protection against so copying boat hulls (see 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1332 (2000)),
the goal of inducing disclosure to stimulate innovation is advanced. See infra text
accompanying notes 14-23 (discussing the relevance of this quid pro quo to the basic thesis
of this essay).
3. Copyright appears to be the only title of intellectual property that has stimulated
much scholarly interest. In a 1981 essay by Professor Lange, he argued “that the growth of
intellectual property in recent years has been uncontrolled to the point of recklessness”
and this “should be offset today by an equally deliberate recognition of individual rights in
the public domain.” David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 147 (No. 4, 1981) (note omitted). In the process of
reviewing the scope of his research, he observed: “Remarkably little attention has been
paid to the public domain in recent years. There seems to have been no extended
treatments of the subject in its own terms. . .” Id. at 150 n.20. In this extended footnote,
Lange acknowledged that he had not attempted “to formulate a general, public domain
theory” but “hoped to encourage a wider concern for its definition in case law and
literature alike.” Id. at 151. Almost a decade later (and with the continued growth of
copyright protection), Professor Litman took up the challenge. See Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). She provocatively begins her article: “Our
copyright law is based on the charming notion that authors create something from nothing,
that works owe their origin to authors who produce them.” Id. (note omitted). She
dismisses this “romantic” view of authorship and argues: “The public domain should be
understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a device
that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving raw material of authorship available

4

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[25:1

for authors to use.” Id. at 968. She concludes that originality is an “apparition,” and,
would reserve the “raw material of authorship to the commons” of the public domain. Id.
at 1019-22. In Wendy J. Gordon’s A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993),
Professor Gordon would go further and assert that the public domain is a source of rights
rather than a mere repository. To accomplish this, she extends Lockean natural law
theory to intangibles and equates this intangible common with the public domain. Id. at
1558. She then defines the components of the public domain: “[T]he public domain is
largely filled with creations whose period of protection has expired, works which have
been abandoned, or works for which no protection existed ab initio. Similarly, if there are
works which under Lockean principles would have only limited duration but would not be
capable of being owned, they would be part of the common.” Id. at 1559 (footnote
omitted). She then goes on to equate “property” with “liberty,” concluding: “For Locke,
the word “property” embraces virtually any liberty or claim to which one was entitled
under the law of nature. The public’s liberty to use the common is a species of property in
even a stronger sense, for as a ‘liberty right’ it is stable and guaranteed entitlement.” Id.
It is conceptually untenable to keep “property” and “liberty” as if they were fully separate
theories. Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Samuels seems to have had the last word —
at least in this round — on any general theory of the public domain in copyright law. See
Edward Samuels, The Public Domain and Copyright Law, 41 JCPS (1993). He concludes:
“The ‘public domain’ is thus not so much a theory as a tendency to resolve border-line or
new cases in favor of nonprotection rather than protection.” Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
Samuels dismisses Litman’s negative definition of the public domain (that which copyright
does not protect) as hardly “more clear than the positively stated one in terms of
originality.” Id. at 141. He questions Gordon’s reliance on Locke as a model of
justification for intellectual property and her reliance on “far fetched” examples that
hardly “would expand the public domain itself beyond the traditional categories.” Id. at
147-149. Samuels concludes: “It seems a little late in the game to be developing a “theory
of the public domain” to put the brakes upon the expansion of intellectual property
rights.” Id. at 182. This seems to be what Boyle is suggesting: “Perhaps we need to invent
the public domain in order to call into being the coalition that might protect it.” James
Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net, 47 Duke L. J. 87,
113 (footnote omitted). My purpose here is not to limit the expansion of intellectual
property (or to expand it further) or to invent (reinvent?) the public domain. My limited
purpose is to attempt to describe the public domain in relation to the private domain, with
both expanding or contracting in response to positive law. See infra note 13 (discussing
the various definitions of “public domain” and “intellectual commons”).
4. See papers presented at the “Conference on the Public Domain,” Nov. 9-12, 2001,
Duke University School of Law, <http://law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html>, including James
Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,
<http://www.james-boyle.com/papers.pdf> (accessed Apr. 24, 2003) (arguing that logical
arguments against the enclosure of the public domain are inadequate; what is needed is an
umbrella concept, similar to the environmental movement, to embrace disconneced issues
arising from privatization); Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Artifacts, Facilities, and
Content: Information as a Common-pool Resource, id. at 44 (analyzing the “intellectual
public domain” as a “common-pool resource” rather than one of “common property” of
the traditional commons; see id. note 1 collecting literature on the public domain); Pamela
Samuelson, Digital Information, Digital Networks, and the Public Domain, id. at 80
(identifying the contributions to the public domain enabled by digitalizing information and
providing digital networks for its distribution and also indicating the threats to the public
domain by various legislation and judicial decisions); Negativland, Two Relations to a
Cultural Public Domain, id. at 108 (arguing that artists have a “logical and inalienable
right” to define what constitutes art including that which copies the copyrighted works of
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appear to be a minimalist concept indicative of the negative legal
conclusion that something is not protectable or protected under the
law. Accordingly, something is either protected (i.e., in the private
domain) or unprotected (i.e., in the public domain). Something may
be in the public domain because it is unprotectable (i.e., it does not
fall within a protectable category of intellectual property; “the law
just does not spread its protection so far”5). In addition, something
may be in the public domain although it fits within a particular title of
intellectual property because it is unprotected, i.e.: (i) protection has
not been sought; (ii) if protection is sought, the subject matter fails to
satisfy formal or substantive requirements for protection; or (iii) if
protection is sought and obtained, the protection has terminated (e.g.
by expiration, abandonment, invalidity). In short, a presumably
discernable dichotomy is drawn between the private and public
domains, with the fundamental distinction being that subject matter
in the latter domain is available to all while that in the former is
subject to the control of the owner.
Under such a dichotomy, the public domain may be impacted in
a number of ways. First, the categories of subject matter that are
protectable may be expanded (e.g. reclassifying certain subject matter
from unprotectable to protectable status; protecting newly discovered
or developed subject matter). This would delay such subject matter
from entering the public domain if protection is sought and obtained.
A second means would be to lower the standards for protection
(formal and/or substantive) with respect to protectable subject
matter. Thus, subject matter now protectable at a lower standard,
that would have previously entered the public domain, is delayed
others); David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and
Transformative Critical Appropriation, id. at 130 (proposing a presumption of fair use in
favor of all transformative works not merely parodies); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Public and the Private in Biopharmaceutical Research, id. at 157 (arguing
that due to the adverse impact on basic research, patenting the results of federally funded
research may not result in maximizing social value); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of
Innovation, id. at 177 (expressing concern that following the idea that because property is
good, more is better, may lead to changing the architecture of the internet to one of
control by the content owner); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the
Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, id. at 192 (urging stricter First
Amendment regulation on copyright protection); J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir,
Promoting Public Good Uses of Scientific Data: A Contractually Reconstructed Commons
For Science and Innovation, id. at 239 (identifying public domain information and urging
access to scientific data as a pubic good); Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic
Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, id. at ___ (analyzing the
case for “publicness” in intangible (intellectual) space compared tangible space with
reference to Roman law).
5. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1926).
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from entering. Delays in entering a public domain may also be
achieved by extending the term for which protection is granted or by
resuscitating works whose protection had terminated. Finally and
perhaps more seriously, the public domain may also be impacted if
subject matter protected under one form of intellectual property
upon termination of that form may continue to be protected under
another form of intellectual property for an extended term.
All of the foregoing impactions are current today to the
correlative benefit of the private domain: there has been an
expansion of protectable subject matter in all areas of intellectual
property.6 The duration of protection has been increased for certain
titles.7 Certain terminated copyrights have been given new life.8

6. In patent law, subject matter protection has been expanded to include, inter alia:
living matter (Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)); computer-related inventions
(Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.175 (1981)); computer programs and methods of doing
business (State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (1998).
In copyright law, 3-dimensional commercial products starting with Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S.201 (1954) extending to a large variety of products from jewelry to soft sculptures
(aka toys); computer programs (see, e.g. Computer Assoc. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693
(1992). In trademark law, color (see Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S.
159 (1995); 3-dimensional “devices” including the interior of a Mexican-style restaurant
(Two-Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S.763 (1992); fragrances (In re Clarke, 17
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 2d 1238 (T.T.A.B.1990; sound (NBC’s three chimes, Reg.No. 523,616
(Apr.4, 1950)). As the Supreme Court stated in Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164: “It is the sourcedistinguishing ability of a mark – not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word,
or sign – that permits it to serve these basic purposes.” See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611
(1999) (elaborating on the shift in philosophy). The same shift in philosophy may be seen
in patent law in Chakrabarty, supra, and particularly in State Street, supra, where Judge
Rich states: “The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter
should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to —
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter — but rather on the essential
characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.” 149 F.3d. at 1375
(footnote omitted).
7. With the possible exception of patents (from 17 years from grant to 20 years from
filing), copyrights, in particular, and trademarks, in one sense, have increased terms of
protection. First, there were the transitional provisions between the 1909 Act and the 1976
Act that extended the copyright of existing copyrights beyond their original expiration
date under the 1909 Act. More recently there has been the extension under the Sonny
Bono Term Extension Act of 1998, Publ.L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.2827. The copyright
term has been increased from life of the author plus 50 years to life plus 70 years (15
U.S.C.A § 303(a)), and for pseudonymous works and works made for hire from 75 to 95
years from publication or from 100 years to 120 years from creation. (Id. § 302(c)). The
constitutionality of this extension was affirmed in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003),
by a 2-1 majority. The sense in which trademark protection has been extended is by the
adoption of an intent-to-use standard rather than by requiring commercial use permitting
the applicant to claim a constructive use date and warehouse the mark for more than four
years. See Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, § 1(b),15 U.S.C.A. § 1051(b) (2000).
8. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (2000). The restoration of these works would clearly
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There are certain indications that lower substantive standards of
protection are being applied.9 There is overlapping protection of the
same subject matter by different forms of intellectual protection
delaying full entrance of that subject matter into the public domain.10
Accordingly, there is increasing concern among those
constituencies who rely upon intellectual subject matter. To these,
any hindrance to full access to intellectual subject matter of whatever
nature may be disconcerting (if not tragic) whether the access is
desired for commercial ends, or for purely academic, artistic or
philosophical pursuits. Professor Lessig laments the insidious assault
on the public domain: “So invisible is public domain that we don’t
even see it when it is everywhere around; so invisible is the idea that

diminish the contents of the public domain in the United States. Derivative works created
on the basis of unprotected foreign works now may give rise to a claim of reasonable
compensation awardable to the owner of the restored work. This may strike some as
surprising that a party, acting in good faith on the basis of existing U.S. law, would find
itself paying reasonable compensation for the use of what was once free. However, this
slight aberration as a consequence of international political compromises should return to
normal once these restored foreign works expire.
9. In patent law, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has essentially been
given free rein and the percentage of patents found “not invalid” has increased
significantly: A recent study by Allison and Lemley found the patent validity rate of the
Federal Circuit during the period 1989-1996 to be approximately 52%. See John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26
AIPLA Q. J. 185, 241 (1998). Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the
historical average for patent validity was approximately one-third. See A. Samuel Oddi,
An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72
NEB. L. REV.351, 393 n.173 (collecting studies). The Supreme Court has only taken one
“obviousness” case under 35 U.S.C.A § 103 (Dann v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 239 (1976) since
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.1 (1966). The much more interesting issue in Dann
v. Johnson was whether a computerized financial recording keeping system was patentable
subject matter under § 101; the Court avoided this issue by relying solely on § 103. The
substantive standard of “originality” has never been very high in copyright law (the “shaky
hand” of Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (1951) and
somewhat more, but not much, of a telephone book (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 449 U.S. 340 (1991)). In trademark law, the Supreme Court has
held that the interior of a Mexican-style restaurant is protectable as an unregistered mark
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.A.§1125(a)), based on a jury finding of
“inherently distinctive” without a requirement of that the mark have acquired secondary
meaning. See Two-Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S.763 (1992). Cf. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Brother, Inc. 529 U.S. 205 (2000), where secondary meaning was required
for the protection of an unregistered clothing design, with Justice Scalia stating that the
holding in Two-Pesos was “inapposite” because clothing was a “product-design” while the
interior of a restaurant was “either product packaging . . . or else some tertium quid akin to
product packaging.” Id. at 206. It is not immediately apparent how strictly one should
construe his new category of “devices tertium quid.”
10. See infra Part V.E (discussing the impact on the public domain of such
overlapping protection — such as when patent protection has expired, yet either copyright
or trademark protection remains in force).
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the free might matter to creativity, that when it is enclosed, we are
convinced this is progress.” 11 On the other side are those producers
and owners of intellectual subject matter who urge expanded
intellectual property protection, insisting that sufficient incentives
must be provided to ensure an adequate supply of intellectual
creations that will redound to the benefit of society as a whole. As
well put by Professor Samuelson: “Whether the public domain is a
virtual wasteland of undeserving detritus or the font of all new
creation is the subject of some debate.” 12
In this article, the concept of public domain will be addressed as
generally as possible. The basic premise is that the public domain
serves primarily as a source of sensory stimuli (which will be termed
the “public-domain-as-stimuli” thesis) and only secondarily as some
sort of “intellectual commons,” where all may freely exploit its
contents.13 As an introduction to this thesis, in Part II, legal and
11. Lessig, supra n. 4, at 189.
12. Samuelson, supra n. 4, at 80.
13. The literature has not produced a consistent definition of “public domain” or
“intellectual commons” (sometime “intangible commons”) or their interrelationship, if
any. Patterson and Lindberg include biological and cultural aspects: The public domain is
not a territory, but a concept. For instance, there are certain materials – the air we
breathe, sunlight, rain, idea, words, numbers – not subject to private ownership. The
materials that compose our cultural heritage must be free for all to use no less than matter
necessary for biological survival. L. R Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of
Copyright: A Law of Users Rights 50 (1991). Litman, supra n. 3, appears to equate the two
and espouses free exploitation. She provides a functional definition: “[T]he public domain
is the law’s primary safeguard of the raw material that makes authorship possible.” Id. at
967. Then she elaborates: “The concept of the public domain is another import from the
realm of real property. In the intellectual property context, the term describes a true
common comprising elements of intellectual property that are ineligible for private
ownership.” Id. at 975. In a recent article, Benkler considers Litman’s “traditional”
definition too narrow and would define the public domain as “the range of uses of
information that any person is privileged to make absent individualized facts that make a
particular use by a particular person unprivileged.” Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 362 (1999). Hence, the public domain would include non-infringing
fair uses (“easy cases”) of otherwise protected subject matter. For Gordon, the public
domain is a component of the “intangible common”: “The most obvious component of the
intangible common is equivalent to what our law now identifies as the ‘public domain’:
those intellectual creations already in existence but not privately owned.” Gordon, supra
n. 3 at 1559. The second component are those “works which, under Lockean principles,
would have only limited duration or would not be capable of being owned. . .” Id. She also
maintains full access to both components. See infra n. 61 (discussing Gordon’s
sophisticated argument that the “intangible commons” constitutes a source of rights in the
public). Reese, without reference to the “public domain” or Gordon’s article, expansively
defines the “intellectual commons”, to include “resources such as language and
symbolism; literary, visual and musical traditions and conventions; the history of idea – in
short, every thing that can be described as ‘culture’ in both the artistic and anthropological
senses.” R. Anthonly Reese, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspective on
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philosophical justifications for the thesis will be introduced. Then the
“creative cognitive process” will be outlined to illustrate how human
intervention though this process, in response to stimuli from the
public domain, transforms and transports subject matter from the
public domain to the private domain. In Part III, the dichotomy
between the public and private domain will be considered in a “stateof-nature” model before the introduction of an intellectual property
system. According to this model, in response to stimuli in the public
domain and as a consequence of the creative cognitive process of the

Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 707, 710 (1995). Madison considers
the public domain to be a cousin of fair use, and would recognize the public domain as a
source of raw material for authorship along with Litman. He then goes on to assert a
political and social dimension: “The public domain may do more: it provides a common
reference library of publicly accessible facts and ideas–an intellectual commons–that gives
our diverse polity the vocabulary and syntax necessary to engage in a variety of political
and social debate and to function at some levels a single community.” Michael J.
Madison, Legal-Ware Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 Fordham L. Rev.
1025, 1097 (1998) (footnote omitted). Hughes considers the “common” in the following
manner: It requires some leap of faith to say that ideas come from a “common” in the
Lockean sense of the word. Yet it does not take an unrehabilitated Platonist to think that
the “field of ideas” bears a great similarity to a common. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L. J. 251, 315 (1988). Id. He defines “‘idea’ to be
shorthand for the unique product of cognitive effort.” Id. at 294. He then would further
subdivides the “common” in two: “a ‘common of ideas’ and a “common of potential
ideas.’” Id. at 323. It would seem to me that, if “ideas” require cognitive effort to be
formed by humans, then “potential ideas” would be stimuli. But for that matter so would
publicly known ideas. Yet another view is that of Schaffner, who offers as an “aside”:
“[I]t is important to understand that the common under Lockean principles is not the
same as the “public domain” for patent purposes. The “public domain” under the patent
laws defines prior art, which will prevent an inventor from obtaining a patent grant.” Joan
E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1081, 1108 (1995). But the
“public domain” definition of “prior art” in the patent law sense is too narrow. Certainly
the claimed invention of a patent is in the private domain while the patent is extant and
still is “prior art” within 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Lessig, supra n. 4 at 180, defines commons
as follows: “By a commons I mean a resource that is free. Not necessarily zero cost, but if
there is a cost, it is a neutrally imposed, or equally imposed cost.” (emphasis added).
Reichman & Uhlir, supra n. 4, at 242, “define public domain in terms of sources and types
of information whose uses are not impeded by legal monopolies grounded in statutory
intellectual property regimes, and which is accordingly available to some or all members of
the public without authorization.” Samuelson, supra n. 4, at 84, provides “A Map of the
Public Domain and Adjacent Terrains.” See also Boyle, supra n. 4, at 26-38, who after
discussing various definitions proposed, concludes: “And what is true for property, is true
for the public domain. Just as there are many ‘properties,’ so too there are many ‘public
domains.’” Id. at 36. “We have not one public domain, one theory of the public domain,
but many.” Id. at 38. Hess & Ostrom, supra n. 4, at 48, conclude: “In relation to the
intellectual public domain, the commons appears to be an idea about democratic process,
freedom of speech, and the free exchange of information. While we agree that freedom of
speech and open exchange of information are fundamental to the creation and sustenance
of democratic systems of governance, we need to develop useful tools for analyzing what
we mean by commons, public demand, and free exchange of information.”
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responding individual, an “idea” is formed in the mind of that
individual. For want of a better definition we can use John Locke’s:
“Idea is the object of thinking.” 14 This idea is privatized (i.e., is in the
private domain) by virtue of being secret. The loss of secrecy
transfers the result of the creative process to the public domain.
The modifications to the basic model necessitated by the
introduction of an intellectual property system will be addressed in
Part IV, including the expansion of the private domain to include a
“strong version” of protection under various titles of intellectual
property in addition to the “weak version” implemented by secrecy.
The public domain will also be compartmentalized to illustrate a
“weak version,” whose function is to serve as a source of stimuli for
the creative process, and a “strong version,” which would also permit
public exploitation in the absence of extant intellectual property
protection. In Part V, the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis will be
examined within the various forms of intellectual property and any
differences identified among them. Because certain intellectual
subject matter is unprotectable in a strong version, consideration will
be given in Part VI to the nature of this subject matter
(“unprotectables”) in the context of the public-domain-as-stimuli
thesis. Finally, some conclusions are drawn concerning modifications
in the intellectual property system as suggested by the public-domainas-stimuli thesis.

II. The Creative Cognitive Process
The legal justification for the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis is
the basic norm of the Copyright/Patent Clause of the Constitution
granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”15 In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the
14. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Great Books Of The
Western World 121 (John Maynard Hutchins ed. 1952). Thus the idea may be said to be
conceived in response to stimuli and cognitive function in the brain by the mental process
of “conception.” See infra n. 27 (further discussing Locke’s theory).
15. U.S. Const. Art . I, cl.8, § 8. As stated in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954):
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.”
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve reward
commensurate with the services rendered.
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purposes underlying the grant of this broad power to Congress were
stated by the Supreme Court in the context of copyrights and patents:
[This] limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate
the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward and to allow the public access
to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired.16
Specifically with respect to copyright, the Court states in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.:
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.” . . . To this end copyright assures authors
the right to their original expression, but encourages others
to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by
17
the work.
In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. the Court elaborated on
the policies underlying patents:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention;
second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate
further innovation and to permit the public to practice the
invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent
requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas
in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public.18
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., decided ten
years after Aronson, the Court went so far to say: “the ultimate goal of
the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
19
public domain through disclosure.” In 1943, during the dark days of
patent law, the Court in Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co. had made
16. 464 U.S.417, 429 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Harper & Row, Publisher, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
17. 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (emphasis added, citations omitted).
18. 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (emphasis added).
19. 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (emphasis added).
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the disclosure aspect of patent policy quite clear:
As a reward for inventions and to encourage their
disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year
monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his
invention a trade secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure
of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one
skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period
of the monopoly has expired. . .20
Even in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., where the Court
upheld state protection of trade secrets against federal preemption,
the disclosure policy underlying patent protection was emphasized:
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it
is circulated to the general public and those especially
skilled in the trade, such add-ons to the general store of
knowledge is of such importance to the public weal that the
Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17
years exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure is
assumed will stimulate ideas and the eventual development
21
of further significant advances in the art.
Nonetheless, the Court found a parallel, at least to one of the
policies supporting patents on a constitutional basis, and went on to
extend the “reward” theory to trade secrets: “The maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention
are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.”22 Obviously,
secret inventions cannot stimulate further inventions; but if the trade
secret can be shared with others by means of licensing, this would
provide licensees with stimulation perhaps leading to further ideas
and creations.
Trademarks by their nature are valuable because of their
commercialization: the more publicity they receive the better. The
underlying policy for granting trademark protection, as set out in
Park’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., is to “secure to the
owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the

20. 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1943) (emphasis added).
21. 416 U.S. 470, 480-481 (1974) (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 481.
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ability of consumer to distinguish among competing producers.”23
While protecting consumers against confusion is highly desirable, the
incentive to create new marks and market them is provided by
excluding competitors from using confusingly similar marks. But, in
any event, competitors and the public in general have access to the
protected mark at least as a stimulus for whatever creative purposes it
may instill.
In sum, I would argue there is a strong theme running through
intellectual property law that recognizes the importance of the
disclosure of intellectual creations for their value as stimuli for further
creations. Without the quo of disclosure, the quid of protection is
undermined.24
If a philosophical justification for the public-domain-as-stimuli
thesis is needed, Emanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason25 would
seem admirably to serve that purpose. In Kant’s view there are two
forms of cognition. One is based on experience, i.e., the perception of
exterior (to the mind) sensations (stimuli). This Kant calls empirical
or a posteriori cognition.26 The other form is independent of sensory
perception but is inherent in the individual’s mental process; as such
he terms this pure or a priori cognition.27 Kant posits that pure
cognition consists of space and time, which are not perceived but
which provide means for ordering perceptions.28 The cognitive
23. 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). The Court, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.
514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995), recognized an efficiency policy underlying trademark protection–
to reduce consumer search time–in addition to the traditional consumer protection and
trade diversion rationales.
24. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 Ill. L.
Rev.1119, 1162-1164) (discussing the “Quid Pro Quo Principle”).
25. Emanuel L Kant, The Critique Of Pure Reason ( Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood,
trans. & eds. 1998 )
26. Id. at 137 (“[E]mpirical cognition [are] those that are possible only a posteriori,
i.e. through experience.”)
27. Id. (“[W]e will understand by a priori cognition not those that occur
independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely
independently of all experience.”)
28. Id. at 157 ([T]here are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori
cognition, namely space and time. . .”) By introducing the concept of a priori cognition,
Kant refutes Locke’s tabula rasa conception that “there is nothing in the mind except that
which was first in the senses.” Locke, supra n. 14, at 121. While Locke’s “Second Thesis
on Civil Government” (see infra n. 47) has recently become a favorite of those seeking to
justify intellectual property on a natural law basis, his “Essay” has been largely ignored
even though it deals fundamentally with cognitive processes upon which the creation of
intellectual subject matter obviously depends. According to Locke there are only two
sources of ideas: “sensation” and “reflection.” Id. Ideas of the “sensation” category are
from perceptions of things (“external objects’) “depending wholly on our senses, and
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process would thus involve an individual’s sensing of an external
stimulus (e.g., from an object – an apple falls from a tree), perceiving
this sensation and ordering it in response to space and time. This
ordered perception may be further processed cognitively to generate
an idea. Whatever may be the metaphysical implications or
complications of time and space as pure cognition,29 modern science
seems to confirm to a surprising extent Kant’s underlying conception
of the cognitive process. The following brief (and admittedly highly
simplified) overview of the cognitive process is offered as an aid to
illustrate the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis. It is, of course, well
beyond the scope of this article to attempt a detailed explanation of
how the peripheral nervous system senses stimuli and how the central
nervous system, in particular the brain, processes transmitted
information about the stimuli. Rather, a brief overview of selected
mechanisms of neurobiology will be used as a basis for discussing
creativity on the level of the mind, which may be simply defined as
“what the brain does,”30 even though we are only beginning to scratch
the surface of how the brain does it.31 As Bertrand Russell put it:
derived by them to the understanding.” Id. The other source of ideas, “reflection,” is
internal from the “the perception of the operations of our minds within us.” Id. Locke
seems to equate thinking to perception and define the power of these as understanding.
29. For present understanding of the relevance of time and space to the nervous
system, see infra n. 34. See also Dee U. Silverthorn, Human Physiology: An Integrated
Approach 278 (2nd ed. 2001) (investigations showing the ability of the brain to change
neuronal connections “show us that the brain is not ‘hard-wired’ as we once had
thought.”) Nonetheless, whether the brain is “pre-wired” for time and space ordering or
“wires” itself in response to external and/or internal stimuli does not affect the prescience
of Kant’s construct. As put by Silverthorn: “One of the most difficult aspects of brain
function to translate from the abstract realm of philosophy into the physical circuits of
neurobiology is the combination of attributes that we call personality.” Id. at 275.
30. Steven Pinker, How The Mind Works 24 (1997). Pinker emphasizes that the mind
is not the brain itself, but the special function of the brain: information processing or
computation. He defines the mind as “a system of organs of computation, designed . . . to
solve . . .problems.” Id. at 21. He views the brain as the processor of information and
thinking as a kind of computation. As the human nervous system is specialized to perform
the function of information processing (including transmitting, integrating, storing and
retrieving information; using information in forming perceptions; thinking and learning,
inter alia), a highly schematic outline is offered here of how the nervous system works.
The focus will be limited to the interface of the nervous system with the individual’s
external environment and will not include consideration of how stimuli arising inside of
the body are handled. The intent is to render the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis less
abstruse.
31. See generally Silverthorn, supra n. 29, at Ch. 8 (“The Nervous System”) 214-251,
Ch. 9 (“The Central Nervous System”) 252-280, Ch.10 (Sensory Physiology) 281-325. See
also Arthur C. Guyton & John E. Hall, Textbook Of Medical Physiology Ch. 45
(“Organization of the nervous system; basic functions of synapses and transmitter
substances”) 565-582, Ch. 46 (“Sensory receptors; neuronal circuits for processing
information”) 583-594, Ch. 57 (“The cerebral cortex; intellectual functions of the brain;
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“The mind is a strange machine which can combine the materials
offered it in the most astonishing ways.”32
In the beginning, incoming stimuli (sight, sound, touch, taste,
smell) are sensed by the respective sense organs, which are part of the
peripheral nervous system.33 In response to these stimuli, information
is transmitted to the central nervous system for processing. A
perception may be formed in the mind in response to what has been
received by a classifying and differentiating process.34 Thus, the
and learning and memory”) 733-748, Ch. 58 (“Behavioral and motivational mechanisms of
the brain–The limbic system and the hypothalamus”) 749-760 (9th ed.1996). The author
notes the irony of understanding least that which is the largest part of the nervous system
(the mechanisms of the brain) and that discussion of thought is difficult because the neural
mechanisms underlying thought are not known. Id. at 742.
32. See
<http://www.quoteworld.org/author.php?thetext=Bertrand%20Russel&
page5> (accessed 3/23/03).
33. See Robert M. Berne & Matthew N. Levy, Physiology 81 (4th ed.1998). Among
its many functions, the nervous system enables individuals to interact with their external
environments. This interaction is accomplished through the action of its three broad
components: (a) a sensory component to detect events in the environment, (b) an
integrative component to process and store incoming sensory data, and (c) an effector
component to generate responses to the stimuli. The peripheral nervous system is that
division of the nervous system that contains specialized sensory receptors that detect
various forms of environmental energy that impinge on the body (e.g., mechanical,
thermal, chemical, electromagnetic, sound, etc). These types of energy act as stimuli to
excite sensory receptors, which then change this information into a signal (nerve impulse)
that can be understood and processed by other nervous system structures. The nerve
impulse carries the particular information about the environment on pathways of nerves to
the central nervous system. The central nervous system is the other division of the
nervous system and is the site of higher level processing of the information received via
the peripheral nervous system. See also Silverthorn, supra n. 29, at 282: All sensory
pathways have common elements: They begin with a stimulus (internal or external) that
acts on a sensory receptor. Receptors are transducers that convert stimuli into electrical
signals. If the signal is of sufficient intensity (i.e. threshold) it passes via the sensory
neuron to the central nervous system, where signals are integrated. Some are perceived
consciously, while others are acted on without conscious awareness. Along the way, the
nervous system can modulate and shape the information. The brain’s perception
(interpretation) of a sensory stimulus may be very different from the actual stimulus (e.g.,
light waves may be perceived as color). Moreover, the brain can “fill in” sensory
information to create a “complete picture,” which is an important aspect of perception.
The process of translating a stimulus into a perception allows information (stimuli) to be
acted on and used in complex cognitive functions (i.e. thinking). Id. at 266. “What we
learn or experience and what we store in memory create a unique pattern of neuronal
connections in our brains.” Id. at 275. See also, Guyton & Hall, supra n. 31, at 565. On
reaching the central nervous system, for example, the information may be assigned
meaning (i.e., perceived) and generate an immediate response (e.g. moving one’s finger
from a hot stove) or may be stored as a memory to help determine reactions to stimuli at
some future date (e.g., avoiding an electric burner when it is turned on). The nervous
system is a network of billions or trillions of nerve cells linked together in a highly
organized manner to form the rapid control system of the body. Id. at 215.
34. See Guyton & Hall, supra n. 31, at 109. Perception, the conscious awareness of
the incoming stimuli, takes place in the cerebral cortex, the outer covering of the brain.
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stimulation produced by an apple falling from a tree may result in a
corresponding perception in the mind of an apple falling from a tree.
We would expect a substantially identical perception by other human
beings observing the same occurrence. The stimulus may be the
sound of the apple hitting the ground, which may be sensed and
correspondingly perceived as the sound of an apple hitting the
ground. Should the person be sitting under the apple tree, the
perception may be that of touch—an object hitting the head and a
response of pain. Spatial relations and time would appear to be
ordered as part of the cognitive process. 35
At this stage of the cognitive process, the perception that an
apple fell from a tree at a particular space and time may be stored in
the memory of the individual. This perception may then serve no
further purpose.36 On the other hand, the perception of an apple
falling from a tree may trigger further cognitive processing, either
shortly after the perception, or at a later date in response to the
The initial processing may include the extraction of selected features of the stimulus, and
serves as a preliminary step to further processing involving a number of other central
nervous system structures. See also Jeane Ellis Ormrod, Human Learning 194 (2d ed,
1995). Differentiating sensation, a physiological phenomenon, from perception, a
psychological phenomenon, illustrates a basic issue that has been identified above. See
supra n. 31. Precise knowledge of underlying physiological mechanisms of higher cognitive
functions of the nervous system is not yet available; thus, language and concepts from the
field of psychology are used to express how the mind functions. Perception, as defined by
Ormrod, is the meaning (i.e., recognition and interpretation) that we give to
environmental stimulation. “The mind interprets and recognizes what the body has
sensed.” Id. At this time, there is a need to rely on data from psychological language and
research to communicate these concepts.
35. See Berne & Levy, supra n. 33, at 100. As noted supra n. 33, sensory receptors
encode the multiple stimuli that impinge on the body so that the information can be
interpreted by the central nervous system. Among the aspects of stimuli that are encoded
are their spatial and temporal characteristics. Id. at 50. See also Guyton & Hall, supra n.
31, at 578: Aspects of these time and spatial characteristics are crucial to the processing of
information because the nervous system structures are limited in the time available for
responding to a stimulus, and stimulation of various areas may be needed to generate a
response. The rapidity and number of impulses is of major importance in information
processing at a cellular level. The significance of time and space is also recognized in the
“holistic theory of thought”, which suggests that thoughts result from . . . “a ‘pattern’ of
stimulation of many parts of the nervous system at the same time and in definite
sequence . . .” Id. at 742.
36. See Guyton & Hall, supra n. 31, at 565, who note that the complexity of the
nervous system enables it to receive millions of bits of information from different sensory
receptors and to integrate all of these to determine a response. In fact, the central nervous
system constantly receives millions of bits of information from the environment. A
mechanism has evidently evolved to protect the brain from being overwhelmed with
information: On a subconscious level, the brain has the capacity to ignore information
determined to be of no importance, to suppress incoming information, or to store the
information as memory for future use. Id. at 743.
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retrieved memory of such a perception in conjunction with others.37
The perception may include an emotional response, e.g. if seeing the
apple falling evokes a happy memory of how good your mother’s
apple pie tasted.38 However, beyond emotional responses a higher
level cognitive processing may occur.39 Included in the higher level of
cognitive processing is the “creative process,” which entails a complex
and incompletely understood mental process resulting in the
formation of a new and original mental conception, i.e. an idea.40 The
37. See Silverthorn, supra n. 29, at 272. In the memory multiple levels of storage with
varying retention times exist. Furthermore, a person’s memory bank is constantly
changing. Newly acquired information can be integrated with stored information, and this
connection of new and old information can be used in reasoning to solve problems or plan
actions. See Guyton & Hall, supra n. 31, at 742-43: Although knowledge about the
mechanisms underlying memory is limited, memories can be stored in the nervous system
for time periods varying from seconds to a lifetime. Intricate chemical and structural
changes in the nervous system are believed to be required for a memory to be
“consolidated” for recall after a period of time. Id. at 745. During the process of
consolidation, memories are codified into different classes of information by using
previously stored information to help process the new incoming information. The brain
sorts through the new and old information for similarities and differences, and then stores
new information in association with the same types of memory (rather like a filing
system). Thus, what has gone before continues to act on new incoming stimuli and to
influence how they are processed.
38. See Guyton & Hall, supra n. 31, at 752. The limbic system, which is situated
under the cerebral cortex (the outer covering of the brain), is known to control emotional
and motivational behavior. The limbic system plays a key role in whether stimuli are
perceived as pleasant or unpleasant. Id. at 756-757. This emotional reaction is a critical
factor in determining which information is stored in memory, as opposed to which
information is discarded or forgotten. See infra n. 43 (discussing the relationship of
memory to creativity.)
39. Complex cognitive functions or processes are commonly designated “higher
level” because they involve more neural interconnections than the transduction and
transmission that take place at “lower levels.” Higher level functions also take place at the
anatomically highest level of the nervous system–the brain. See also Gerald C. Cupchik,
Perception and Creativity, in 2 Encyclopedia Of Creativity 355 (Marc A. Runco & Steven
R. Pritzker eds. 1999) (the cerebral cortex is identified as the site of thinking logically and
hypothetically, which is associated with the “higher order processing involved in
creativity”) Id. at 359. See also John C. Houtz & Cathryn Patricola, Imagery, in 2
Encyclopedia, Id. at 1-2, (noting that the creative process is considered to be primarily
cognitive).
40. See Ruth Richards, Four Ps of Creativity, in 1 Encyclopedia, supra n. 39, at 733742. Richards summarizes the four conceptual approaches to the studies of creativity
conducted over the past 40 years: Person, product, press of environment, and process.
Studies of person may include attempts to identify characteristics of ongoing traits or
fluctuating states of the creator. The product aspect is focused on the outcome or results
of creative effort, such as a concrete product or an idea. Studies of the press of
environment seek to discern the surrounding circumstances necessary to release creative
production. Attempts to identify the ways in which creative individuals think, feel,
motivate themselves, and behave as they generate original and meaningful products are
involved in the process approach to studying creativity. See, e.g., Houtz and Patricola, in 2
Encyclopedia, supra note 39, at 1, where creativity is defined as “the cognitive processes
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creative process is individualized and subjective in contrast to what
may be expected of an objective perception of an object. The process
would involve, inter alia, the individual’s memory, rational thinking
process (logical thinking), motivation, problem solving ability, talent,
and a final component, which though little understood, may be called
41
creativity. Memory, especially, is thought to play a critical role in

that lead to the production of new, original ideas, processes, or artifacts that are judged to
be useful or otherwise of some value.” Others (Gerald C. Cupchik, in 2 Encyclopedia,
supra n. 39, at 355) view creativity as a bi-directional process involving integration of
higher level (i.e., intellectually based) central nervous system processes with sensorybased (i.e. “lower”) peripheral nervous system processes). Creativity results as higher
level processing modifies the “automatic” processes of “transduction, feature extraction
and figural synthesis”of information coming from stimuli. See also Edward Necka,
Memory and Creativity, in 2 Encyclopedia, supra n. 39, at 193. Necka emphasizes that
“there is no evidence whatsoever” that external sensory stimuli, when initially received,
are connected to creative processes/abilities. Id. at 193-194. Rather, creativity is an
activity of the mind executed through memory. Id. at 193. One might conclude, therefore,
that all stimuli received from the external environment must be acted upon by stimuli that
have previously been subjected to processes of encoding and storage by the central
nervous system for the generation of creativity.
41. That the creative process is individualized and subjective to the individual creator
may be inferred from descriptions of information processing in the nervous system,
especially the aspects of memory processing. See infra n. 43. Studies of creative
individuals across different fields have yielded a plethora of characteristic patterns. See
Michael A. West & Tudor Rickards, Innovation, in 2 Encyclopedia, supra n. 39, at 45
(identifying cognitive flexibility, self-discipline and self-direction, a high degree of drive
and intrinsic motivation, concern with achieving excellence, perseverance, ego strength,
independence of judgment, ability to tolerate ambiguity, and need for freedom in work.
Id. at 47-48. See also Ravenna Helson Personality, in 2 Encyclopedia, supra n. 39 at 361
(including in creativity: concern for meaning (as opposed to concern with facts for their
own sake), intellectual curiosity, high investment in work, ability to give form to ideas, and
other distinguishing motivational, cognitive, and affective traits). Id. at 361-370. See, in
addition, Richards, in 1 Encyclopedia, supra note 39, at 735 (citing the existence in creative
persons of “core” personality traits and features of cognitive style, including
independence, flexibility, nonconformity, and openness to experience, among others).
Cropley provides a cognitive definition of creativity as the production of “effective
novelty.” Effective novelty is beyond mere novelty (e.g. difference or variability) and
would involve additionally the satisfaction of “technical, professional, aesthetic, or
scholarly criteria.” Arthur J. Cropley, Creativity and Cognition: Producing Effective
Novelty, 21 Roeper Rev. 253 (1999). He then goes on to indicate the steps in the creative
process: “Thinking, reasoning, and problem solving can be regarded as cognitive processes
that use existing information to produce further information. (In the case of creativity this
further information would contain effective novelty.) This involves selecting from among
the masses of information available at any moment (i.e., perception is not simply a passive
acceptance of everything that impinges on the senses or is already stored in the mind);
relating new information to what already is known; combining elements of new and old
information; evaluating newly emerging combinations; selectively retaining successful
combinations (which may then function as new information, returning the process to the
phase of relating elements of information; [and] communicating the result to others.”
Id. at 257. (It is not apparent to me why “communicating the result to others” must be
part of the process. The creative person could decide to keep the idea/creation secret and
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creativity.42 This particularized high level cognitive process could
produce wide ranging and different ideas among individuals.43 The
still be creative.)
42. See Edward Necka, Memory and creativity, in 2 Encylopedia, supra n. 39, at 193199. Necka describes several elements in the stages of memory processing that he believes
may account for individual differences between creative and less- or non-creative
individuals. He maintains that creativity cannot occur without participation of one’s
memory structures and processes, but notes that, as yet, no psychological theory regarding
this relationship has been developed. Id. at 193. Necka’s perspective may be summarized
as follows: The stages of memory processing (encoding, storage, retrieval) determine how
one’s long-term memory performs functions associated with creativity, problem-solving,
and insight. Id. at 195. During the encoding of information received from external
stimuli, incoming information is “labeled” and categorized for storage. How this activity
differs between creative versus non-creative individuals may contribute to creativity:
Creative individuals are viewed as encoding differently because they tend to perceive the
world in an “unusual subjective and personalized manner” Id. In addition, creative
individuals are thought to simplify complex information for storage Id. at 196. Creative
individuals are also thought to differ significantly in how their brains store information in
the memory banks. See generally id. at 196-197. As noted supra n. 37, the information
already stored in the memory continually acts on incoming information from external
stimuli. A “selective forgetting” process may eliminate any unnecessary information and
enable the creative individual to view problems from a new and different perspective.
Selective forgetting may account for the phenomenon of “incubation” or unconscious
production of a (creative) idea and precedes its illumination and elaboration. In addition,
an element termed “familiarization,” in which repeated efforts to solve a problem are
unsuccessful, acts to eventually render the problem more understandable, clearer and
simpler. The final element in the storage process is termed “spontaneous recovery.” This
element is defined as the likelihood that information that has been dormant for a time will
be recalled. Necka assumes that one’s long-term memory is progressively organized in an
unintentional manner during the storage stage, and that this organization is important for
creative thinking because the mental sets and obstacles to attaining original ideas are thus
eliminated. Id. at 196-197. The third stage of memory processing, retrieval, refers to the
ability to recall from memory the information previously encoded and stored. Necka
suggests that creative ideas may exist in long-term memory just “waiting” to be noticed
and used. Id at 197. The decoding of information for retrieval depends on cues; the
creative individual may be able to use new labeling cues different from the initial coding
categories to broaden the approach to solving a problem. That is, creative individuals may
be more inclined to conduct a global, rather than a restricted, search of the information
stored in the memory. Necka infers that a “priming stimulus” activates the memory and
enables the creative person to make remote, unusual associations across many different
categories of information, thereby giving rise to new and original ideas. Thus, he
concludes that aspects of the memory of the creative individual differ qualitatively from
the memory of those who are less creative. Id. at 198.
43. The foregoing description of how the human nervous system processes
environmental stimuli (see supra nn. 33-39) offers substantial evidence for the proposition
that the same environmental stimulus may be processed with radically different outcomes
by different individuals. The complexity of the genetic make up of the individual nervous
system, the number and types of past experiences that each individual undergoes, how a
particular nervous system handled particular environmental stimuli (which were stored,
ignored, discarded, etc.), and how previous perceptions were ordered to what effect would
seem to ensure that differences in conception would inevitably occur. Clearly, in light of
evolving knowledge of how an individual’s nervous system processes information from
environmental stimuli, identical stimuli may produce indifference in one individual, while

20

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[25:1

stimulus of the falling apple in the context of the creative process may
lead to a scientist’s conceiving the law of gravity,44 a poet’s conceiving
an “Ode to a Falling Apple,” an artist’s conceiving a painting “An
Apple Falls,” a chef’s conceiving a recipe for an apple soufflé.
The idea as a result of the creative process may remain in
intangible form as a mental conception. The creative process,
however, may not end here. The next step may be the transformation
from the intangible idea conception to a tangible implementation,
which will be called here a “creation.” This creation may be a work
of authorship, an invention, a trade symbol, or other tangible thing.
The creative process continues, as the idea may require refinement
and improvement, or even a change in direction as the attempt to
implement this idea is undertaken. The process continues during the
course of implementation with new stimuli being perceived,
conceived, then entering the creative process to produce the desired
creation.
In sum, while the perception of a quite ordinary occurrence in
life may, to the vast majority of us, be merely that (an apple fell, so
what?), it may in creative individuals be a stimulus toward a
fundamental scientific discovery, a magnificent work of art, or an
invention of great societal value. This is not to say that the stimulus
per se is the cause, but, at least, it is a cause in the sine qua non sense,
i.e., an integral component of the creative cognitive process involving
talent, motivation, rational skills, problem-solving ability, and
creativity. The creative process of each individual (however vibrant
or placid) is sui generis and distinctive to that person; indeed,
creativity may be the most distinguishing characteristic of
45
individuals. Again bearing in mind that the foregoing is a highly

in another the same stimuli produce something of creative genius. Our perceptions of
environmental stimuli clearly do not order themselves automatically into coherent thought
or creative invention. It is the unique mental processing of the individual that gives shape
and molding to the objective phenomena.
44. The story that Isaac Newton’s discovery of the law of gravitational force was
stimulated by a falling apple is attributed to John Conduitt, the husband of Newton’s
niece: [When Newton] “was musing in a garden it came into his thought that the power of
gravity ([which] brought an apple from the tree to the ground) was not limited to a certain
distance from the earth but the power must extend much farther.” James E. Force, Isaac
Newton, The Columbian History Of Western Philosophy, 424-425 (Richard H. Popkin,
ed.1998). Whether the great scientist was actually hit by an apple remains a subject of
historical, if not philosophical, speculation.
45. If Sir Isaac Newton had an identical twin brother (thus having an identical generic
structure) who had a substantially identical environment (upbringing, education,
experience, etc.), it would be far from assured that the brother would have responded in
the same way to the apple.
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schematic description of the creative cognitive process, it may at least
serve the intended purpose of providing a theoretical foundation for
exploring the dichotomy between the public and private domains,
first in a “state of nature” and then in an advanced state with the
introduction of an intellectual property system.

III. Public/Private Domain Dichotomy in the “State of
Nature”
In what may be called the “state of nature,” at a time prior to the
adoption of an intellectual property system,46 the basic dichotomy
between the public domain and the private domain is defined by
secrecy.
Reference to Figure 1 may aid in considering this
interrelationship within the context of the creative process. This
model is a linear one with a single feedback loop. Stimuli from the
public domain are acted upon by human intervention in the creative
cognitive process. As a consequence, an idea is formed by the
individual and privatized in the private domain by the maintenance of
secrecy. When secrecy is lost, the idea is de-privatized and fed back
to the public domain as such (i.e., the idea itself).

46. We need not go so far back as Locke to a pre-law or pre-property state of nature.
Intellectual property protection in a systemized way dates from the fifteenth century. The
Council of Venice enacted a general patent statute in 1474. See Guilio Mandich, Venetian
Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 176-177 (1948) (translating and quoting
statute).
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Figure 1. Linear model of creative process, with single feedback loop.
PUBLIC
DOMAIN

CREATIVE
COGNITIVE
PROCESS

Stimuli

PRIVATE
DOMAIN

Conception /
Creation

A. Public Domain

As conceived here under a Kantian model, the public domain
consists of all stimuli from the external world perceivable by the
senses of humans. These stimuli emanate outside of the individual to
be processed by an individual’s cognitive processes, as described
above. The stimulus may emanate from a simple material object (an
apple) or from a complex of objects and materials (a machine,
painting, treatise, symphony). The stimulus may be from the concrete
(from the tangible object itself) or the most abstruse rendering
(reading a passage from a metaphysical tract). In sum, stimuli range
on a continuum from the most abstract to the most concrete capable
of being perceived by humans. The stimulus may come from any
source external to the perceiving individual from any of the senses—
reading a book, observing nature, listening to music or to another
person, feeling an apple, smelling a rose. In addition there may be
internal stimuli emanating from the individual’s brain from memory
47
or other aspects of the cognitive process.
The primary source of external stimuli is from that which is
publicly known and hence accessible to all. In addition there are
stimuli that are not publicly known, namely, those that have not yet
been perceived (e.g. bacteria before being observed under a
microscope) and those that have been perceived but not yet made
public (after bacteria were discovered but before the discovery was
made public). All these forms of stimuli may be said to be in the
public domain.
A public domain consisting of known (previously perceived) and
unknown (yet to be perceived) stimuli is obviously different from the
public domain in the form of a tangible commons in the “state of
47. See supra n. 43 (concerning the importance of memory in the creative process).
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nature” in the Lockean sense. In the words of Locke:
Whatsoever then [a man] removes out of the State that
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own,
and thereby makes it his Property. . . at least where there is
enough, and as good left in common for others.48
Hence, a person is entitled to the apples picked from a tree in the
“commons” if the proviso is satisfied. Overpicking apples, like
overgrazing the village commons, violates the proviso and leads to the
consequent tragedy of over-exploitation of tangible resources.
However, with respect to the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis, all
stimuli are non-rivalrous by nature and are available to all who may
be in a position to be stimulated.49
The Kant-based conception of the public domain as stimuli as
envisioned here is also different from one (perhaps a Platonic one)
where the sometimes-called “intellectual commons” consists not
merely of stimuli but of intangible forms of ideas, inventions, works
of authorship, etc. These forms then are supposedly ready to be
picked from the commons —much like apples — through intellectual
intervention.50 In the present model, the public domain serves only as
a source of stimulation for the creative process of individuals,
although stimuli may include, inter alia, inventions, works of
authorship, etc.
B. Private Domain

As outlined above, when stimuli emanating from the public
domain are sensed by one or more sense organs of an individual, a
perception in the mind of the individual may be produced. In

48. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government, in Two Treatises of Government, Ch. V 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
49. There is, of course, no common response to any given stimuli. Moreover, stimuli
may be transitory. Halley’s comet was last here in 1986 and is not expected to be visible
again for another 75 years around 2061. Interestingly, Edmund Halley, after whom the
comet was named, predicted its orbit but never saw the comet. He unfortunately did not
live long enough to see his prediction come true. The stimulus for his prediction obviously
came
from
something
other
than
actually
observing
the
comet.
<http://www.mste.uicu.edu/scied/ci407/htmlproj/halley/halley.html> (showing photographs
of the comet from 1910 and 1986).
50. See supra n. 13 (considering various definitions of the “intellectual commons” in
relation to the “public domain”) and infra n. 61 (discussing the “intangible common” as a
source of rights).
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response to this perception, and as a consequence of the cognitive
process, an idea may result, so that an idea may be said to be
conceived. The creative process may end here with only an idea.
However, at this stage, there may be further cognitive activity
coupled with physical labor to implement the idea into a tangible
form — a “creation.”51
With the conception of the idea, it may be said that the
conceiving individual has a natural right to that idea in what may be
termed the “weak version” of the private domain, whose protection
depends on maintaining the idea in secrecy. This applies to all forms
of ideas, and as such constitutes a natural right in a weak form of that
individual, at least, to keep it secret, i.e., not to disclose it except
voluntarily. The weak form of protection will continue through the
conception stage to a tangible stage (creation), if so implemented,
contingent on maintaining secrecy.52
The period of protection in the weak version will depend upon
the period of secrecy. This could be very short with the conceiver
blurting the idea out to the world,53 or it may have an extended period
of secrecy54 and may even die with the conceiver.55 The fact that one
individual has conceived and kept secret the idea or tangible version
thereof and has as such privatized it (at least in this weak sense) does
not affect the ability of others to perceive the same or related stimuli
from the public domain and to privatize by the creative process the
51. This is consistent Lockean property theory of mixing ones person by labor into
the creation thus making the tangible work product the “property” of its creator. See
Hughes, supra n. 13, at 300-14 (discussing the labor theory in the context of intangible
ideas). Note the term “creation” will be used to indicate the tangible work product of the
creative process whatever its form, while “idea” will be used with reference to intangible
conceptions.
52. As put by Weinreb: To the extent one accepts the Lockean premise that
individuals are independent and self-sufficient, an author’s entitlement to the fruits of his
labor can perhaps be maintained while he keeps his work, fixed or unfixed, to himself for
his own use. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
.1149, 1227 (1998).
53. While Moses may only have been a “receiver” rather than a “conceiver,” he had
exclusivity in the Ten Commandments until he disclosed them to the Israelites.
54. One such example is the original formula for Coca-Cola. Similarly, a handwritten
recipe was recently found in the basement of the former mansion of Colonel Harland
Sanders by the purchasers of the mansion. The recipe listed 11 herbs and spices and was
thought to be the “original” recipe. KFC was quick to file suit against the couple to
maintain the secrecy of the recipe. A spokeswoman for KFC’s parent corporation,
however, maintains that “the Colonel’s secret original recipe is safe and sound locked in
our vault.” See <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/01/28/national/main267700.shtml>
(accessed March 17, 2003).
55. Unfortunately, we may never know what we missed. On the other hand, not too
many of us are likely to be terribly interested in the trade secrets of mummification.
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same idea themselves.56 Should another conceive the same idea, the
weak version of propertization would result, provided the condition
of secrecy is maintained. If someone misappropriates the idea from
its originator and publicly discloses it, the conceiver may seek redress
against the misappropriator; however, this will not generally mitigate
against the loss of the weak form of protection to the public domain.57
C. The Public Domain Revisited

With the loss of secrecy, the idea or creation protected only in a
weak version enters the public domain as stimuli and remains there
for the taking through sensory perception. The idea/creation is as
much a stimulus as any other stimuli-producing thing in the public
domain. Indeed, the idea/creation has enriched the public domain
according to the creative contribution of the conceiver/creator.58 In
the state of nature without an intellectual property system, once a
particular idea/creation enters the public domain, it presumably will
be not only available as stimulus but also may be exploited by
others.59 This may be conceptualized as the “strong version” (“black
hole” model) of the public domain,60 even to the extent that such a
56. A classic example of this is the controversy over who was the first inventor of the
calculus. Newton published his first full treatment of the calculus 20 years after Leibniz.
However, Newton had discussed the calculus in unpublished manuscripts dating back prior
to Leibniz. There were charges of plagiarism and derivation from both sides, but it would
appear they both arrived at the calculus independently while using somewhat different
terms. See Donald Rutherford, The Newton-Leibniz Controversy, The Columbian History
Of Western Philosophy, 431-437 (Richard H. Popkin, ed. 1998). In justification for
protecting trade secrets against being preempted by the Patent Act, the Supreme Court in
Kewanee, supra n. 2, 416 U.S. at 490, makes the following observation: “The ripeness-oftime concept of invention, developed from the study of the many independent multiple
discoveries in history, predicts that if a particular individual had not made a particular
discovery others would have, and in probably a relatively short period of time. If
something is to be discovered at all very likely it will be discovered by more than one
person.” [citation of such studies omitted].
57. Ideas would appear to be at least as difficult to suppress as rumors. See infra text
accompanying n. 167 (quoting Thomas Jefferson on the difficulty of affording property
status to ideas).
58. See Hughes, supra n. 13, at 316 (note omitted) (“[O]nce a ‘new’ idea has been put
into intellectual commerce, once people know about it, it leads to an ‘expansion’ of the
common, or of the accessible common.”).
59. This is with the assumptions that the other party has not acquired the
idea/creation or is using it in a manner that may be categorized as commercially unfair.
The fact that an idea/creation may be deemed in the public domain does not justify unfair
competition. See supra n. 2.
60. The “black hole” model evidently is the position of the Supreme Court, at least in
the context of expired patents. Justice O’Connor concluded in Bonito Boats,supra n. 2,
489 U.S. at 161: “For almost 100 years it has been well established that in the case of an
expired patent, the federal patent laws do create a federal right to ‘copy and to use.’ Sears
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version of the public domain may be a source of rights in the public.61
and Compco extended that rule to potentially patentable ideas which are fully exposed to
the public.” The Court found the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision in
Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed.Cir.1985) (Rich, J.) “troubling,” which held
that a state anti-direct molding process statute was not preempted by federal patent law
since “the patent laws ‘say nothing about the right to copy or the right to use, they speak
only in terms of the right to exclude.’” Id. at 685. (quoting from Mine Safety Appliances
Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 902) (C.C.P.A.1969) (J. Rich). As stated
by Justice O’Connor: “The Interpart court’s assertion to the contrary is puzzling and flies
in the face of the same court’s decisions applying the teaching of Sears and Compco in
other contexts.” Id. While I have somewhat of a vested interest in defending the
reputation of Judge Rich, it may be suspect to extend the obiter dictum of Mine Safety to
the ratio decidendi of Interpart; however, the patent laws indeed are directed only to the
right to exclude as implementing the Copyright/Patent clause of the Constitution.
Moreover, aside from the “troubling” remark, Judge Rich’s commentary on the public
domain is enlightening: “Patent laws function only to keep things out of the public
domain temporarily. They have nothing to do with putting things into it. They say nothing
about right to copy or right to use, they speak only in terms of right to exclude. ‘Public
domain,’ moreover, is a question-begging legal concept. Whether or not things are in or
out of the public domain and free or not free to be copied may depend on all sorts of legal
concepts including patent law, antimonopoly policy and statutes, the law of unfair
competition, copyright law, and the law of trademarks and trademark registration. What
we really do is to determine these legal rights; then we may express the ultimate
conclusion by saying something is in the ‘public domain’— or not in it.” Id. In other
words, what Judge Rich is saying, and what I am trying to elaborate further upon, is that
there is no general right to copy or to use based upon the public domain, if there is an
extant intellectual property right that may have its exclusionary right violated, and, of
course, even when there may be a right to copy and to use, the copier/user may not pass
off its copied product as that of the originator’s. Whatever may be the scope of rights to
copy and use inventions included in expired patents or unpatented subject matter, there
may still be available federal exclusionary rights based on trademark and/or copyright, less
whatever limits are placed on states to so protect. See infra Part V.E.
61. Gordon, supra n. 3, argues on the basis of Locke’s natural law/labor theory that
the public has a property interest (“entitlement” in the “intangible common”): “For
Locke, the word “property” embraces virtually any liberty or claim to which one was
entitled under the law of nature. The public’s liberty to use the common is a species of
property in even a stronger sense, for as a ‘liberty right’ it is a stable and guaranteed
entitlement.” Id. at 1559 (notes omitted). She had previously defined a “liberty right”: “I
use the phrase ‘liberty right’ to denote the moral entitlement to do or not do something
free of duties owed to others or to God. A ‘liberty right is a privilege to which one has a
vested entitlement.” Id. at 1541 n. 46. She then concludes: “It is conceptually untenable
to treat ‘property’ and ‘liberty’ as if they were fully separate categories. Every
conventional private property right contains a “liberty to use, some liberties are public
property strong enough to keep conventional private property from forming.” Id. at
1559-1560 (n. 153 omitted after “liberty to use”). To justify “liberty to use” in the public by
means of the “common” she must give them a property interest in the “common”. In n.
153 she cites 17 U.S.C. § 106 for the right of copyright owners to “do” certain acts. Of
course, we are no longer in a state of nature. Positive law grants these “exclusive rights”.
Copyright owners, like the owners of other titles of intellectual property and tangible
property, do not have an absolute “liberty to use.” They are all bound by positive law in a
post-state-of-nature legal system. In the case of intellectual property, there may be a
“blocking” situation where superceding intellectual property rights may preclude the
“liberty to use”. See infra text accompanying n. 107-116 (discussing “blocking” situations).
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The loss of secrecy entails the loss of the natural right and any right to
exclusive knowledge or use of the idea/creation. Nonetheless, the
public domain in all cases is the repository of de-privatized
ideas/creations as stimuli and as such may be considered the “weak
form” of the public domain, though not an original source of rights.
To reward a conceiver/creator beyond what is entailed in secrecy
requires societal intervention to maintain some form of protection
(e.g., exclusivity) after the idea or creation becomes publicly known.
This intervention is normally by means of an intellectual property
system as a “strong version” of protection constituting various forms
of intellectual property. However, it could be envisioned–perhaps on
a natural rights theory–that courts could enforce a strong version of
protection without constitutional or legislative authority.62

IV. Public/Private Domain Dichotomy Within an Intellectual
Property System
Figure 2 illustrates the modifications to the state-of-nature model
of Figure 1 to accommodate the introduction of an intellectual
property system and the compartmentalization of the public domain
into weak (as stimuli) and strong (as exploitable) forms. The creation
and adoption of an intellectual property system, for whatever
philosophic or policy reasons, requires a fundamental modification of
the private domain from the unitary form of protection of secrecy to
provide some form of protection after an idea/creation becomes
public. With this modification, the private domain would include two
components: one is the previously designated “weak version,” which
would still maintain the natural right of secrecy to the
conceiver/creator; the other is designated the “strong version” as
implemented by the intellectual property system, which provides a

Nonetheless, Gordon’s analysis is ingenious and a footnote is a poor vehicle for doing it
justice. The point I want to make is that in our post-state-of-nature intellectual property
system positive law determines what is left to the public. At minimum, however, the
public should be entitled to the stimulus value of publicly available subject matter. The
proper balance between incentive to create and access to exploitation by the public
remains the unanswered question.
62. This would seem to be the result if the copying of a product unprotected by a
form of intellectual property could be enjoined without proof of an unfair trade practice
beyond the fact of copying by the copier. This was the issue in Sears and Compco. See
supra n. 2. It could also be envisioned that such protection could evolve according to the
common law to encompass various creations akin to copyright and patent protection
analogously to the development of common law trademark protection. Establishing a
common law period of exclusivity would present a problem, but it could be based on
continued use (non-abandonment).
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“positive” right63
that will withstand loss of secrecy of the
idea/creation and will continue to provide a certain scope of
protection depending upon the particular title of the intellectual
property involved.

63. This has been designated a “positive” right to distinguish it from a natural right
based on secrecy. The “positive” right arises only by virtue of the intellectual property
system as established by legislation or judicial decision. It should, however, be recognized
that this “positive” right is one of exclusion in the negative sense rather than necessarily as
a right to exploit oneself. See infra text accompanying n. 107-113 (discussing blocking
situations). This usage is consistent with Hohfeldian terminology that the correlative to
the claim right to exclude (stay off Blackacre) is the duty not to exploit (break the close).
See generally, Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J.16 (1913); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J.710(1917). Based upon
Hohfeld’s work, Corbin provides the following definitions: “(1) RIGHT: A legal relation
between two persons. The correlative of duty, and the opposite of no-right. An
enforceable claim to performance (action or forbearance) by another. It is the legal
relation of A to B when society commands action or forbearance by B and will at the
instance of A in some manner penalize disobedience. (2) DUTY: The correlative of the
concept right, above defined, and the opposite of privilege. It is the legal relation of a
person, B, who is commanded by society to act or to forbear for the benefit of another
person, A, either immediately or in the future, and who will be penalized by society for
disobedience. (3) PRIVILEGE: The correlative of the legal concept no-right and the
opposite of duty. The legal relation of A to B when A (with respect to B) is free or at
liberty to conduct himself in a certain matter as he pleases; when his conduct is not
regulated for the benefit of B by the command of society; and when he is not threatened
with any penalty for disobedience, for the reason that society has made no command. . .
(4) NO-RIGHT: The correlative of privilege, and the opposite of right. The legal relation
of a person (A) in whose behalf society commands nothing of another (B). A has no
control over B. A, knowing that he has no right against B, can answer this question,
“What may another person (B) do?” (A court will not prevent him or penalize him.)”
Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale L.J. 163, 167-168 (1919). See
infra text accompanying notes 181-182 (further elaborating on these concepts).
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Figure 2: Modifications to creative process model, incorporating an
intellectual property system and illustrating weak & strong forms of
public and private domains.
PUBLIC DOMAIN
Weak Version
(as Stimuli)

Strong Version
(Exploitable)

PRIVATE DOMAIN
CREATIVE
COGNITIVE
PROCESS

Weak Version
(Secrecy)

Strong Version
(IP System)

A conceiver/creator may elect to convert the weak version into
the strong version by taking advantage of the intellectual property
system, at least to the extent that it is applicable to the particular
creation. In order to convert from the weak version to the strong
version, it is necessary that the requirements of a particular title of
intellectual property protection be satisfied.
These requirements generally include: (1) qualifying subject
matter, (2) compliance with formal and substantive standards, and (3)
transformation of the intangible idea into tangible form–a creation.64
With a satisfaction of these requirements, the creator may thus
enter the strong version of the private domain, which would provide
protection within the scope afforded by the particular title of
intellectual property obtained. On the other hand, if a particular
creation does not qualify as subject matter protectable by at least one
of the recognized titles of intellectual property, upon public disclosure
64. This does not mean that an invention must be actually built. It is only necessary
that the invention be disclosed in the patent application in sufficient detail that it would
enable one skilled in the art to replicate it. See 35 U.S.C.A.§ 112. For copyright, the work
must be fixed in a tangible medium of protection. See 15 U.S.C. A. § 101. For trademark,
at least a drawing of the mark sought to be registered must be submitted. See Lanham Act
§ 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051.
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this creation will go directly into the public domain as stimulus in the
weak version and also, at least at this stage, into the strong version.
This is illustrated in Figure 2 by the feedback loop between the weak
version of the private domain to both weak and strong versions of the
public domain. The same disposition would occur with respect to a
creation for which the strong version of intellectual property
protection is not sought or, if sought, fails to satisfy the formal or the
substantive requirements for protection. In sum, three dispositions of
a creation are possible: (1) it may remain in the weak version of the
private domain by maintaining secrecy; (2) it may be transferred to
the public domain by the loss of secrecy; or (3) it may enter the strong
version of the private domain by intellectual property protection.
Nonetheless, unless maintained in secrecy, the creation becomes a
sensory stimulus to others. Any restraint on the exploitation of the
creation by others is imposed by the strong version of protection, if
65
any.
A creation that has been protected by the intellectual property
system under a strong version also eventually loses that protection.
This termination may occur in a number of ways: expiration at the
end of a statutory term of protection, abandonment, disclaimer,
dedication to the public, a holding of invalidity.66
The introduction of an intellectual property system does not
change the dichotomy between the public and private domains
according to the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis; it is the loss of
secrecy that places creations in the public domain as stimuli. That
which prevents the exploitation of a creation protected by a strong
version of intellectual property is the positive law that establishes and
grants such protection. Nonetheless, everything that has been made
public with respect to the protected subject matter enters the weak
version of public domain as stimuli from that time.
With the termination of the strong version of protection, one
may expect that the protected subject matter would go into the strong
version of the public domain and be available for all to exploit. This
expectation remains to be examined.
65. Again, this is with the assumption that access to the conception/creation is not
obtained by an unfair trade practice.
66. In theory, a holding of invalidity by a court or an agency renders the title of
protection void ab initio, with the protected creation being considered unprotected from at
least the time of its public disclosure. The question of whether any consideration (e.g.
license fees already paid) may be recouped for exploitation rights prior to the holding is
another matter. See Studiengellschaft Kohle, m.b.h. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1567
(Fed.Cir.1997) (stating that no recoupment—enforcement of contract rules to pay
royalties not contingent on validity of licensed patent).
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V. The Public-Domain-as-Stimuli Thesis Within the Titles of
Protection
So far the public/private domain dichotomy has been addressed
with respect to the intellectual property system in general without
particular reference to the major titles of protection. With the
introduction of an intellectual property system and the creation of the
right to exclude certain others from infringing the protected creation,
a distinction must be drawn between independent creation and
derivative creation. An independent creation would be one not based
upon (i.e. without knowledge of) another’s creation. A derivative
creation would be one based upon (i.e. with knowledge of) another’s
creation. This distinction then raises the question of the rights of the
independent creator compared to the derivative creator in exploiting
the creation. In the state of nature, before the introduction of an
intellectual property system, independent creators should be entitled
to equivalent rights to their creations at least in the weak form. With
the introduction of an intellectual property system, the answer would
seem to depend upon how strong is the strong version of protection
granted under a particular title of protection. With the supposition
that there may be differences, the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis will
be examined with respect to the major titles of protection.
A. Trade Secrets

In essence, trade secrets are ideas67 that have been further
67. Ideas as intangibles would appear to be the basic conceptual starting point for all
intellectual property beginning at the most abstract level and then proceeding to a more
detailed state. The legal protection of ideas, as one might expect, is quite weak. The
generally stated requirements for protection are that the idea be “concrete” and “novel.”
See, e.g., Richter v. Westab, Inc. 529 F.2d 896, 902 (6th Cir.1976) (“The law does not favor
the protection of abstract ideas as the property of the originator. . . A concept is of little
use until solidified in a concrete application.”); Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31
N.Y.2d 56,61, 286 N.E.2d 257,259 (1972) (“Lack of novelty in an idea is fatal to any cause
of action for its unlawful use.”). California seems to take a more liberal view of idea
protection. See, e.g. Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: California and New York Are More
Than 3,000 Miles Apart, 13 Hastings Comm.& Ent. L. J. 115 (1990). There is no
formalized statutory regime of protection. Protection depends upon other bodies of law:
tort (misappropriation); contract (express, implied, quasi); property (sometimes alluded to
but rarely invoked). The various theories of protection are nicely summarized in Paul
Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines 44-49 (Rev.4th
ed.1999). Whenever an idea is conceived in the mind of an individual in response to the
creative process, it is protected in the weak version as a natural right by virtue of
maintaining it in secrecy. With respect to the individual who independently conceives the
same idea without knowledge of the idea from original conceiver or the public domain, the
same natural right would accrue. If and when the idea is made public, it becomes a
stimulus in the public domain. Nonetheless, even with respect to an idea in the public
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refined and concretized so as to provide commercial value to the
possessor over competitors who do not know of the trade secret.68
The law, as might be expected, treats trade secrets more kindly than it
does ideas, both on the basis of the common law and on statutory
protection in many states.69 Also trade secret conversion relating to a
product to be placed in interstate or foreign commerce has been
made a federal criminal offense.70 Misappropriation and confidential
relationships may be established more easily when trade secrets
compared to more abstract ideas are involved.71 This may be
expected because of the competitive nature of trade secrets as
opposed to the more generalized aspect of ideas. Accordingly, the
weak version of protection is stronger for trade secrets than for ideas.
It would also be an expectation that the creative process would go
beyond the conception stage and that some tangible fixation of the
trade secret would be created and that the trade secret would be
capable of being practiced within the veil of secrecy.72
domain but subjectively unknown to another, the latter may be willing to pay someone
who does know of it for its transfer. See, e.g. High v. Trade Union Courier Publishing
Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (1946) (While the idea disclosed may be common or even
open to public knowledge, yet such protection, if protected by contract, is sufficient
consideration for the promise to pay.”). However, this does not alter the basic model, for
had the public domain been searched, the idea could have been obtained freely. Whatever
value may be obtained by inter partes transfer does not affect the generalized theory. In
short, ideas would appear to fit nicely into the model of perception from stimuli in the
public domain, the conceptualization in the mind and hence privatization in weak form,
and upon public disclosure, disposition in the public domain (the idea now as a stimulus).
Moreover, the idea would not only be available as a stimulus in the weak version of the
public domain but also would be deposited in the strong version to be exploited; however,
exploitation and stimulation may merge at this level of abstraction.
68. See Restatement (3d) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995): A trade secret is any
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others. See also Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4): “Trade secret” means information
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process,
that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
know to, and being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
69. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been enacted by 41 states and also the
District of Columbia.
70. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 90 (2000).
71. See, e.g, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th
Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971) (misappropriation in flying over a plant under
construction and taking photographs); Philips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623 (5th Cir.1994) (implied
confidentiality between owner and prospective acquirer).
72. Certain types of conceptions/creations obviously do not lend themselves to trade
secret protection due to their easy comprehension upon public disclosure. Also there is
always reverse engineering stimulated by the public disclosure. However, processes may
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Thus, trade secrets would follow the basic creation process of
stimulus, perception, conception and creation. Independent, nonderivative creations of the same trade secret would be afforded the
same natural right of secrecy. With loss of secrecy, the weak form of
protection is lost and the trade secret enters the public domain in the
weak version as stimulus and also in the strong version to be
exploitable by others in the absence of a strong version of private
domain protection.73
B. Trademarks

The creation of trademarks would seem to follow a similar
creative process, however, with some qualifications. In the first place,
the public domain as the source of stimuli would seem to play a more
direct role in creating trademarks than with respect to other types of
intellectual property. Nonetheless, with respect to arbitrary marks
created for a particular product or service, a close following of the
process would be expected.74 Also, the creative process would result
in fanciful or suggestive connection being made between certain
marks and certain products or services.75 Nonetheless, stimuli from
be maintained in secrecy for long periods of time where the marketed product does not
itself disclose its method of manufacture. Also, analysis of the product may not entirely
reveal its composition.
73. Compare Kewanee, supra n. 2, 416 U.S. at 470, discussing the misappropriation of
the trade secret (a process) was by former employees of the trade secret holder and the
sale of the product made according to the process did not disclose the secret. In this
situation, the weak form of protection would still be afforded until public disclosure of the
trade secret itself.
74. E.g. coined words such as “Kodak” which did not exist as such until created by
Eastman Kodak. Also, the Nike swoosh may not have existed in exactly that form until
designed by Nike Corporation, while “Nike” is a previously known word in the public
domain appropriated in what could be categorized as fanciful usage with respect to shoes
and other clothing items.
75. The degree of creativity in adopting “Wheaties” for breakfast cereal may be
debated, but human ingenuity did make the connection with quite economically successful
results over a long time period. Compare Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding
that trademarks did not fall within the Copyright/Patent clause of the Constitution): “The
ordinary trademark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery. The trademark
recognized by the common law is generally the growth of a considerable period of use,
rather than sudden invention. It is often the result of accident rather than design. . .If we
should endeavor to classify under the head of writings of authors, the objections are
equally strong. . . The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor.
. .The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence
as the distinctive symbol of the party using it.” Id. at 96-97. While we may agree with
Justice Miller that trademarks were not intended to be encompassed by Article 1, § 8,
clause 8, trademarks would seem to be subject sometimes, at least, to creation in a
“eureka” moment, while inventions may be of the “perspiration” type; and is it always the
case that there is more creativity in a map or compilation than in the Nike “swoosh” and
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the public domain in the form of existing words, names, symbols or
devices, as well as stimuli of other forms both external and internal,
are perceived, and as a consequence of the cognitive process, lead to
the conception and creation of marks for particular products or
services.76
Second, the weak form of protection by means of secrecy would
seem to play a minimal role with respect to trademarks, except to the
extent of keeping an unused but desirable mark from competitors’
knowledge. With the availability or intent-to-use applications,
secrecy would seem to be of even further diminished importance.77
Third, the acquisition of the strong form of protection is substantially
automatic with the further concrete step of the adoption and use of
the mark according to state common law. A stronger form of
protection may be obtained by registration, particularly federal
registration, by complying with the formal and substantive
requirements for registration. Of particular relevance here is the
statutory imposition of constructive notice against any junior users of
the mark under the Federal (Lanham) Trademark Act.78
Accordingly, with constructive notice of a federally registered
mark, junior users who independently create and adopt the same
mark or a colorable imitation would be barred from any uses that
would infringe the originally registered mark.79 This would not be a
permanent bar because upon the abandonment of the registered
mark, the mark again would become available for others to adopt.
Nonetheless, for the period of registration of the mark, it remains
unavailable within the confines of likelihood of confusion; moreover,
should the mark be accorded “famous” status and hence protected
that the latter is not a “fruit of intellectual effort”?
76. Even those marks that are not inherently distinctive (e.g. descriptive of the goods
or services) must be adopted by a cognitive process and perhaps with the recognition that
their descriptive value is greater than immediate distinctiveness.
77. Under Lanham Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 1051(b), an intent to use application
may be filed prior to actual commercial use. If the applied-for mark is found registerable,
it is published by the Patent & Trademark Office for opposition. §§ 15 U.S.C.A. 1062(a),
1063. At this time, it hence becomes a stimulus for others; however, upon actual use of the
mark by the applicant, it will be registered and provide protection from the application
date on the basis of constructive use from that date. 15 U.S.C.A.§ 1057(c).
78. 15 U.S.C. A. § 1072.
79. See, e.g. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959)
(“[B]y eliminating the defense of good faith and lack of knowledge, § 1072 affords
nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the area in which the registrant
actually sues the mark.”) (Nonetheless, the court refused to enjoin the junior user from
continuing to use the registered mark in its market area because it concluded there would
be no likelihood of confusion in that area, but would be subject to being barred if the
registrant should enter that geographical area.)
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under the anti-dilution provisions of the Lanham Act, it would be
extracted from use for whatever goods or services within the confines
of “likelihood of dilution,” even though there is no likelihood of
confusion.80 This result is analogous to patent law but contrary to
copyright law, where constructive notice is not imposed.81
With the making public of a mark, whether by use or publication,
the mark goes into the public domain as a stimulus and is available
for use in the creative process. Nonetheless, with the acquisition of a
strong version of protection by registration, others may not infringe.
With the abandonment or the invalidation of the registration, the
mark would also enter the strong version of the public domain. An
abandoned work then could be exploitable by its adoption and use by
others and re-privatized to the exclusion of others.82 With respect to
an invalidated registration, if the invalidation falls within one of the
absolute proscriptions against registration (e.g. the work is generic,
deceptive, or functional83, exploitation of the work would be
permissible within the bounds of unfair competition, in particular,
passing-off.84 In short, all marks serve as stimuli from their being
made public. However, when de-privatized, they may be recycled
and re-privatized if they may again serve as valid marks.
C. Copyrights

According to copyright law, the dividing line between the weak
version of protection (common law copyright) and the strong version
(under the Copyright Act of 1976)85 is fixation by or with the
authorization of the author. Copyright protection “subsists with the
fixation of original works of authorship in a tangible medium of
expression.”86
The creative process would normally involve perception of
sensory stimuli in the public domain, conception in the mind of the
work at some level of abstraction and, at least for the strong version
of federal protection, fixation in tangible form and a modicum of
80. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (2000).
81. See infra nn. 91-95 (discussing copyright) and nn. 103-108 (discussing patents).
82. Compare Manhattan Industries, Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628
(2d Cir. 1980). General Mills expressly abandoned the well known mark “KIMBERLY”
and two competitors tried to adopt it immediately thereafter. The court held that neither
could appropriate the mark exclusively and could only use it in a manner not to confuse
consumers.
83. See 15 U.S.C.A § 1052(a)-(d), (e)(3) and (e)(5) (2000).
84. See supra n. 2 (discussing Singer and Shredded-Wheat cases).
85. 17 U.S.C.A §§ 101-810 (2000).
86. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (2000)
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creativity to satisfy the “originality” standard. This creative effort on
the part of the author generally would involve the expenditure of
labor and resources in the fixation. The transformation from
intangible idea to tangible original work (creation) through the
creative process would be the instrumentalist justification envisioned
in the Copyright/Patent Clause of the Constitution for protection in
the strong form.
The work itself may, of course, include
unprotectable elements not satisfying the subject matter or qualitative
standard of originally to be protected.87 Indeed, all the elements (as
stimuli) may be extracted from the public domain and receive
protection on the basis of originality in the form of a derivative work
or a compilation.88 The transfer from weak to strong version would
appear to be automatic upon the fixation, provided the qualitative
standard of originality is satisfied. Upon publication of the work, its
contents, including original expression, go into the public domain as
stimuli. The positive law protects against the exploitation by others
of the original expression from the protected work. Non-protected
portions of the work remain available for exploitation as well as
serving as stimuli.
The fixed work, however, may be kept secret (unpublished) by
the author and still be entitled to the strong form of protection.89
Being maintained in secrecy would, of course, preclude the work’s
contents (both protected and unprotected) from serving as stimuli for
others. This raises the question whether the instrumentalist goal of
the Copyright/Patent Clause of the Constitution is being served if the
public is denied the stimulus value of the copyrighted but secret work.
The copyrighting of computer programs without the disclosure of
“original” code is an egregious example.90
In response to any stimuli (except by means of access to the
protected work), others through utilization of their creative process
87. E.g. “any idea, procedure, process, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery” are excluded in § 102(b). Also excluded would be non-original portions of the
work, such as copied sections quoted or plagiarized from other works. See generally
Copyright Regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2003).
88. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2002).
89. Copyright protection subsists from fixation in tangible form, not from the date of
publication. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 102(a). With the individual author’s term of protection
being based upon life (plus 70 years), there would be no diminution of duration compared
to fixed time from publication under the 1909 Act. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 24 (28
years from first publication and renewable for another 28 years.).
90. See 37 C.F.R.§202.20(c)(vii)(A) (requiring for both published and unpublished
computer programs the deposit of the first and last 25 pages of source code which, of
course, enables the depositor to include only “garbage” in these pages while maintaining
an “original” code in secret.).
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may arrive at the same creation independently - the “Ode on a
Grecian Urn” syndrome.91 Originality, not objective novelty, is the
standard, with access to the copyrighted work being required for
infringement.92 Thus, the scope of protection under the strong version
is limited to derivative conception and fixation–the plagiarist is not an
author.93 Indeed, again in theory, the “second author” of the Ode
should be entitled to copyright protection.94
Copyrights are time-limited by the Constitution, and upon the
expiration of the copyright the strong form of protection over the
original expression of the work also expires, thus privileging what
would otherwise be infringement. The entire work, it should be
noted, entered the public domain, as stimulus, from its publication.
In sum, copyright law, as presently constituted, respects natural
law, in that independent creation is recognized, and permits
protection of the independent creation under the weak version. It
also goes one step further to permit protection under the positive
copyright law upon fixation of non-derivative original expression.
Upon the publication of the work in fixed or unfixed form, the
contents go into the public domain as stimuli. Whatever limitation
placed upon another’s exploiting these stimuli is governed by positive
copyright law within the context of infringement.
Upon the
expiration of the copyright, that which would have constituted
infringement during its term is privileged in the sense that the creator
has no right to exclude anyone from doing what previously would
have been infringement. This privilege is nonetheless not absolute if
there happens to be a positive law basis to preclude that exploitation,
91. In the words of Judge Learned Hand: “Borrowed the work must indeed not be,
for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto an ‘author’; but if by some magic a man who had
never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an
‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of
course copy Keats’s.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d. Cir. 1936).
92. Evidence of access to the copyrighted work may be rather slim, including
“striking similarity” based upon expert testimony. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d
1061,1068 (2d Cir.1988) (“Though striking similarity alone can raise an inference of access,
that inference must be reasonable in light of all evidence.) Cf. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d
896,901 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring “at least some other evidence which would establish a
reasonable possibility that the complaining work was available to the alleged infringer.”)
93. See supra n. 91.
94. Id. This is the consequence of a subjective “originality” standard in copyright law
as compared to the objective novelty standard of patent law. See 35 U.S.C.A.§ 10 (2002).
As stated by Justice Connor: “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that
the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copies from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).

38

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[25:1

as will be discussed below.95
D. Patents

The creation of an invention may be viewed as responding, inter
alia, to stimuli from the public domain being perceived and then
formed in the cognitive creative process in the inventor’s mind as an
idea that evolves to a patent term-of-art “conception.”96 Some or all
of the elements of the conceived invention may be found in the public
domain and the inventor may have responded to these, or perhaps
not. The creative process would continue if the conceived invention
is “reduced to practice” (actual or constructive).97 To transform the
conceived invention into tangible form normally requires the
expenditure of labor and resources as well as creativity. At this stage
the inventor has the option of maintaining the invention in secrecy (as
a trade secret) or of filing a patent application. If the inventor elects
to exploit the invention commercially while not filing for a patent
application within the one-year grace period fixed by the patent
statute, patent protection will be denied even though the invention
has been maintained in secrecy, albeit commercialized.98 Also, if the
inventor decides to keep the invention secret even without any
commercialization, failure to file an application for an extended
period of time may result in the abandonment of the invention in
terms of patent protection.99
On the other hand, if the inventor sought to invoke the strong
version by applying for a patent, until recently, the application would
be kept secret until the patent was granted. Under a new provision in
the Patent Act, the application will be published eighteen months
95. See infra nn. 101-107.
96. See Jacoks v. Sohl, 280 F.2d 140, 143-144 (C.C.P.A.1960) (Rich, J) (quoting with
approval from Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App.D.C. 264, 276, 1897 C.D. 724, 731): “The
conception of the invention consists in the complete performance of the mental part of the
inventive act. All that remains to be accomplished, in order to perfect the act or
instrument, belongs to the department of construction, not invention. It is therefore the
formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete
and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice.”
97. The invention need not be actually constructed but will be considered
constructively tangible by a written description, drawings, etc., provided these would
“enable any skilled in the art to which [the invention] pertains” to make or use the
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2002).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002): “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless–. . .(b) the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or
in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States. . .”
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c); Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto
Parts, 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.1946).
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after filing unless no application on the same invention is also filed in
a foreign country that publishes applications.100 For unpublished
applications that do not result in a patent being granted, the
application continues to be maintained in secret.101 Alternatively, by
filing the patent application within one year from the public use or
placing on sale of the invention, the applicant may cure any loss of
secrecy and deposit in the public domain that might otherwise occur
by this conduct.102
A major deviation is seen in the scope of protection granted
under a patent as compared to the preceding titles of protection. The
basic rule implementing natural law has been that independent
creators can privatize creations independently perceived and
conceived by them even though there had been prior (but nonderivative) privatization in either the weak or strong versions.103
However, according to patent law, only one inventor is awarded the
patent on a given invention. The patent system is a lottery type of
system with only one winner, regardless of whether there is a “first
inventor” system, such as in the United States, or a “first to file”
system, which prevails throughout the rest of the world.104 The
exclusive patent monopoly is granted for the benefit of only one
inventive entity.
The consequences of this are to deny the
independent inventor of the same invention any right to privatize
except to a very limited extent: (i) secrecy always affords a weak
version of protection, and (ii) any “independent inventor” rights that
are recognized as a defense to infringement. For the first time,
Congress has enacted a “prior inventor” defense, but in such a narrow
form as to be applicable only as a defense to infringement of
“business method” patents.105 Thus, it will not be of any appreciable

100. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2001).
101. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(i) (2001).
102. The one-year grace period is granted under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (quoted supra n.
98).
103. Compare the constructive notice imposition in the Trademark Act (Lanham Act)
§ 22, 17 U.S.C. § 1072, with respect to registered marks. See supra text accompanying nn.
76-79.
104. The “first inventor” system has merit in terms of the lottery winner being, at least,
first in time to conceive the invention even though later to reduce it to practice, rather
than being more efficient in winning the race to the Patent Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
105. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (Defense to infringement based on earlier inventor). The
limitations on the applicability of this defense are many, including: it only applies to
“methods of doing or conducting business.” 35 U.S.C. 273(b)(3)(A). The prior inventor
must have actually reduced the invention to practice at least one year prior to the filing
date of the patent and have commercially exploited the method prior to the filing date. 35
U.S.C. 273(a)(1). The prior inventor may not license the invention. 35 U.S.C.
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benefit to the vast majority of independent inventors.106 Nonetheless,
any exploitation (making, using, selling, offering for sale or
importing) of the patented invention107 constitutes infringement and a
violation of the exclusive rights granted under the strong form of
protection, even when performed by an independent inventor, except
in the exceptional situation when that inventor may qualify for the
“prior inventor” statutory defense. The same analysis would apply to
design patents as to utility patents with the grant of a design patent
blocking exploitation of the ornamental design by other independent
inventors of the same design.108
Thus, the vast majority of independent inventors do not have the
right to exploit their own creations, which is seemingly contrary to
natural law theory. However, the grant of a patent encompasses only
the “positive” right to exclude others and not what may be called the
“strong version of the positive right” to exploit the claimed invention.
There may be one or more so called “blocking” patents owned by
others. The most common blocking situation would be where an
“improvement” patent could not be exploited without the consent of
the owner of the “basic” patent, whose invention has been improved
by another.109 In the same sense, the Lanham Act grants the
registrant of a trademark only the right to prevent others from
273(b)(3)(C). Also, they may only assign the invention with the enterprise or line of
business. 35 U.S.C. 273(b)(7). The intent appears clear to limit the scope of “business
method” patents expressly approved in State Street, because of the inherent difficulty of
determining what the prior art is with respect to such intentions. How broadly “methods
of doing or conducting business” will be interpreted remains to be seen. See State Street,
supra n. 8, 149 F.3d at 1375-1377. After all, the claims in the patent involved in State
Street were written in “machine” form. See generally David H. Hollander, Jr., The First
Inventor Defense: A Limited Prior User Right Finds Its Way Into U.S. Patent Law, 30
AIPLA Q. J.37 (2002).
106. However important “business method” patents might seem to Congress, they no
doubt constitute a small percentage of all patents granted, where the independent inventor
would have no such defense to infringement.
107. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001).
108. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (2001).
109. Another blocking situation could occur where the basic invention cannot be
commercialized without employing a separately patented subcomponent. Bell obtained
the basic patent on the telephone but did not have a commercially viable microphone for
his telephone.
Edison had invented and patented a microphone suitable for
commercializing the telephone. These were thus blocking patents. Bell could not use
Edison’s patented microphone and Edison could not use Bell’s telephone. Bell was able
to acquire the patent rights from Berliner to an equivalent microphone to circumvent the
block and eventually settled the telephone litigation with Western Union and acquired
rights under the Edison patent. Both the Berliner and Edison transmitters were used by
Bell. See Robert V. Bruce, Alexander Graham Bell and the Conquest of Solitude,
Technology In America 105-111 (Caroll W. Pursell, Jr. ed. 1981); Arvin F. Harlow, Old
Wires And New Waves 375-387 (1936).
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infringement.110 However, the potential “blocking problem” would
seem to be resolved by tying the registration requirement of no
likelihood of confusion with another mark to the same standard of
likelihood of confusion for infringement.111 The Copyright Act is
bolder and expressly grants to the copyright owner “the exclusive
right to do and to authorize” the listed exploitations of the
copyrighted work.112 This asserted strong version, however, should be
taken with a grain of salt, because the grant of a copyright obviously
would not authorize any exploitation of the copyrighted work if that
exploitation resulted in the infringement of an extant patent or a
trademark or, indeed, another copyright.113
Returning to patents, the “second” independent inventor will
suffer economic consequences because the investment in the
independent creation will be lost if this investment was induced by
the possibility of obtaining a patent.114 Moreover, if patent protection
is only available to one (a lottery type of system), this may result in
“rent dissipation” in the form of excessive investment in an effort to
be the first one to develop the invention to a protectable level.115
Also, whatever increased incentives may exist with respect to a
lottery-type system, it is far from clear that inadequate incentives
would be provided if intervening rights were recognized with respect
to independent inventors.116 Nonetheless, it is not apparent that the
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (providing a civil action for the unauthorized use of a
registered mark). However that registration provides prima facie existence of the
registrant’s “exclusive right to use.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(a). If the mark has become
incontestable under §§ 15, 17 such is conclusive evidence of that “exclusive right to use.”
15 U.S.C.A.§ 1115(b)).
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (denying registration to a “confusingly similar,” to an
already registered mark or one used by another in commerce).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing the exclusive rights to (1) reproduction; (2)
preparation of derivative works; (3) distribution; (4) performance; (5) display; (6)
performance (digital audio transmissions)).
113. Using a copyrighted computer program may infringe a patent; marketing a
copyrighted “sculpture” may infringe a trademark on a two or three dimensional device;
performing a copyrighted motion picture may infringe a copyrighted play.
114. If the investment was induced by other than the patent system (e.g. the market),
the loss can not be attributed to the fact that the patent system only rewards the first
inventor. See A. Samuel Oddi, Uni-Unified Economic Theories of Patents–The Not-QuiteHoly-Grail, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 277-281 (1996) (discussing patent-induced and
market-induced inventions).
115. On the rent dissipation theory, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis Of
Law 37-38 (4th ed. 1992) (analyzing costs and giving the example of searching for a
sunken treasure ship); Mark F. Grady, Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent
Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 305 (1992) (with particular reference to inventions).
116. Certainly the minimalist approach limiting intervening rights to “business
methods” adopted recently in the United States would seem to have minimal effects on
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scope of protection provided under the patent system or any of the
strong forms of intellectual property would have an adverse effect
upon the public domain; indeed, one could conclude that the stronger
the strong version, the greater the incentive to create subject matter
that would ultimately be deposited in the public domain. In sum,
while denying independent inventors the right to exploit their
inventions may be considered unjust and result in inefficient
consequences, the public domain is not affected, because all
inventions became stimuli upon becoming public.
On the other hand, an important question remains: What are the
consequences within the public/private domain dichotomy when a
patent expires or is prematurely terminated by being declared invalid
or disclaimed by its owner? First, a distinction may be made between
claimed subject matter (i.e., the invention as claimed) and subject
matter disclosed in the written specification and drawings but not
claimed as the invention. Unclaimed subject matter, even though
previously unknown to the public, would go into the public domain
upon publication of the patent document or public disclosure,
whichever occurred first. The unclaimed subject matter is said to be
117
“dedicated to the public,” and only the claimed subject matter is
maintained within the strong version of the private domain as the
exclusive right of the inventor. On the termination of the patent by
expiration or otherwise, the claimed subject matter would then no
longer be subject to the patent owner’s exclusive control.
Nonetheless, under the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis, the claimed
invention, upon being made public in the patent document or by
public use, also enters the public domain as a stimulus for perception
by others. The exploitation of the claimed invention is that which is
limited by the positive patent grant. This then leads to the problem of
overlapping subject matter eligible for more than one form of
intellectual property protection

any incentive offered by the patent system. See supra text accompanying nn. 103-106.
117. See Edward Miller & Co. v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350,352 (1882): “But
it must be remembered that the claim of a specific device or combination, and an omission
to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the fact of he patent, are, in law, a
dedication to the public of that which is not claimed. It is a declaration that which is not
claimed is either not the patentee’s invention, or, if his, he dedicates it to the public.” The
same may be said with respect to inventions for which patent protection has not been
sought. As put by Justice O’Connor in Bonito Boats, supra n. 2, 489 U.S. at 149: “Once an
inventor has decided to lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he must choose the
protection of a federal patent or the dedication of his idea to the public at large.”
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E. Overlapping Subject Matter

So far the assumption has been that a particular creation, if
protectable, is to be protected by a particular title of intellectual
property, i.e. there is no overlap that would permit the same subject
matter to be protected by more than one title of protection.
However, the reality is that the intellectual property system has
evolved so that the same creation may be protectable and protected
by more than one title.118 This reality introduces complications in any
consideration of the public domain. With multiple protection of the
same creation and hence protection ending at different times, the
same creation may be exploited free of infringement with the
termination of protection under one title but protection still may be
extant with respect to the same creation under another longer-lived
title.
As a consequence of the possibility of overlapping protection, a
conflict arises concerning the availability for public exploitation
(strong version of the public domain) of a creation whose protection
has terminated under one title while still being protected under
another title. Creations do not automatically sort themselves into the
seemingly most appropriate title of protection. If overlapping
protectable subject matter is permitted, the creator has an option of
selecting one or another or multiple titles of intellectual property
protection. Rationally, creators should select the title or titles of
intellectual property protection to optimize their returns.
The possibility of overlapping subject matter with respect to the
strong versions of intellectual property protection is probably, at least
in part, an unintended consequence of a complex and evolving
119
The absence of industrial design
intellectual property system.

118. As put by Justice Reed in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954): “We do hold
that the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright
as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is
patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.” Prior to March 1995, the
Copyright Office refused to register a copyright on a design if a design patent had issued.
To avoid this, applicants would merely file for the copyright first because the Patent Office
did not require an election between patent and copyright. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389
(C.C.P.A. 1974). The Copyright Office dropped the “election doctrine” in March 1995.
See 60 C.F.R. §.15606 (1995). See infra nn. 134-137 (discussing potential overlap between
patents and trademarks).
119. It is hard to see any grand design in the intellectual property system. We
continue to rely on the traditional forms but continue to expand them as time, technology,
art and commerce go on. Attempts to legislate sui generis protection for “gaps” in the
traditional system have been largely unsuccessful.
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protection has also contributed to overlaps,120 as have technological
developments, such as computer programs and other technology that
does not quite fit into traditional categories. A pure system having no
overlaps, with each title having its own defined scope of protection,
would no doubt be an aspired archetype.121 Nonetheless, such has not
been the reality of the development of the intellectual property
system; indeed, the overlaps seem to be expanding rather than
contracting.
If the discussion is limited to patents, copyrights and trademark,
overlaps could occur where the same creation was protected by: (1)
patent and copyright and/or trademark; (2) patent and trademark
and/or copyright; and (3) copyright and trademark and/or patent.
The owners of the overlapping protection would most likely be the
same; however, this would not be universal, as different entities might
own different titles of protection on the same creation.122
120. The gap created by the lack of industrial design protection has forced enterprising
intellectual property attorneys to seek protection in the recognized forms of intellectual
property. Their efforts have pushed the limits of protection, which may have resulted in a
higher level or protection for longer terms. Industrial designs that would have gone into
the public domain (strong version) earlier, continue to be protected.
121. A pure form evidently was the aspiration of those advocating sui generis
protection for semiconductor mask protection and computer programs. The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914, is an example, where
after 10 years of negotiating, the Act was passed, and then no infringers were to be found.
See Ronald S. Laurie, The First Year’s Experience Under the Chip Protection Act or
“Where are the Pirates Now That We Need Them?” Computer L., (Feb. 1986), 13-14. The
absence of “pirates” evidently was a consequence of the availability of computer-aided
design that obviates the need for copying maskwork. See Robert L. Risberg, Five Years
Without Infringement Litigation Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Unmasking
the Spector of Chip Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process Technologies,
1990 Wis. L. Rev. 241. A similar failure has occurred in the attempt to legislate a sui
generis system of computer software protection. The problem was well stated by Professor
Samuelson: “Programs are in truth too much of a mechanical process to fit comfortably in
the copyright system and too much of a writing to fit comfortably in the patent system.”
Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms
and other Computer Related-Inventions, 39 Emery L. J. 1025, 1128-29 (1990). But there
they are in both and are likely to remain there. The TRIPS Agreement essentially
forecloses the sui generis route for computer programs. TRIPS Agreement Art.10 (1):
“Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary
works under the Berne Convention (1971).”
122. The typical case would be where a utility patent is acquired, and after its
expiration, protection is sought to be extended under trademark law. The Singer and
Shredded Wheat cases are old examples of this with respect to word marks. See supra n. 2.
More recent examples include 3-dimensional product design being asserted under § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act after the utility patent has expired or is invalidated. See, e.g. Vornado
Air Circulation Systsems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10thCir. 1995) (grill of
household electric fan); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp, 65 F.3d.654 (7th
Cir.1998) (electric cable tie); TrafFix Device Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc., 200 F.3d 929
(6th Cir.1999), cert.granted, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000) (sign stand). See infra n. 139 (for further
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Doctrinal attempts are made to avoid or at least minimize these
overlaps. The Copyright Act of 1976 makes federal preemption
express to prohibit states from providing copyright-like protection.123
There has been an ongoing struggle at the Supreme Court level to
restrain states from providing patent-like protection by means of
common law unfair competition torts and legislation directed to
states’ particular subject-matter interests.124 On the other hand, the
Court has held that state protection of a trade secret is not preempted
by patent law even though the trade secret may contain clearly
patentable subject-matter.125 This result strengthens the weak form of
protection at the expense of a reduced incentive to secure patents and
relatively quick public disclosure of the invention, including an
enabling disclosure.126 Having co-equal status with federal protection
of marks (registered and unregistered) is not preempted by the
federal patent or copyright statutes.127
Any potential conflict between overlapping patent and copyright
protection is theoretically resolved by § 102(b) of the Copyright Act,
which excludes from copyrightability “any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery.”128
These categories presumably are assigned to the patent system or are
not protectable at all (e.g., facts, research, scenes à faire).129 However,
history of the TrafFix case). Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), is an example where the
copyright on a lamp base was owned by one entity and sustained against design patents
owned by others.
123. Under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301, original works that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression are preempted from state protection whether published or
unpublished if the right claimed falls within the exclusive rights listed in § 106.
124. This started with Sears, supra n. 2, and Compco, supra n. 2, (preempting state
unfair competition law and culminated with Bonito Boats, supra n. 2 (preempting a state
anti-direct molding statute), reaffirming the former with some excursions in between. See
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (not preempting a license contract
when no patent protection had been acquired); Kewanee, supra n. 2, 416 U.S. 470 (not
preempting trade secret protection when a patent could have been acquired).
125. Kewanee, supra n. 2.
126. See Schaffner, supra n. 13 (making a strong preemption argument against
common law protection of patentable trade secrets).
127. See Bonito Boats, supra n. 2, at 166: “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)] creates a federal remedy for making ‘a false designation of origin, or any false
description of or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same. . .’ Congress has thus given federal recognition to many of
the concerns that underlie the state tort of unfair competition, and the application of Sears
and Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a product which have been shown to identify
source must take account of competing federal policies in this regard.”
128. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
129. “The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘[n]o author may copyright
his ideas or the facts he narrates.’” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
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when the creation involves a three-dimensional object (e.g., a lamp
base), the overlap between copyrightable and patent subject matter
becomes apparent, particularly with regard to design patents. The
resolution of this overlap is attempted by introducing an exception to
the definition of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”130 as
excluding “useful articles” that have “an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not really portrayed the appearance of the article for it to
convey information.”131 Protection would be limited to “pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately and
are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the
article.”132 With respect to computer programs, the overlap is again
apparent, as software for copyright purposes falls within the “literary
works” category and is excluded under §102(b), and programs are
protectable subject matter in patent law if correctly claimed.133
Potential conflicts between patent and trademark law arising
from the definition of trademarkable subject matter are intended to
be resolved by the doctrine of “functionality.”134 Again, a creation
considered functional is relegated to the realm of patent, while
trademark is restricted to nonfunctional distinctive marks.135 The
ambiguity of this doctrine has raised serious questions concerning its
separating function.136 Particular concern arose when the trademarked
499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991), quoting from Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S.539, 556 (1985). See Hoehling v. Universal City Studio, Inc., 618 F.2d
972 (2d Cir.1980) (discussing facts, research and the scenes à faire doctrine).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 101.(2003).
133. Compare Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (claiming an algorithm) and Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S.584 (1978 ) (claiming an algorithm with “insignificant” post-solution
activity) with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (a method transforming uncured
rubber into cured rubber products). See also Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (1998) (not requiring a physical transformation).
134. The Supreme Court defined a product feature as being functional “if it is essential
to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,850 n.10 (1982).
135. As stated in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-165: “It is
the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time. . .after
which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s functional features could
be used a trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without
regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because
trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity).”
136. See A. Samuel Oddi, Functions of Functionality in Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L.
Rev. 925 (1985), reprinted in 76 Trademark Rep. 308 (1986) (discussing the various
definitions and applications). See also A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation: From Tort to
Intellectual Property, 88 Trademark Rep. 101, 137-146 (1998) (updating the problems
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product design was claimed and/or described in a patent, especially
when the patent expired.137
It may be even more difficult to rationalize overlaps between (1)
design patents and copyrights and (2) design patents and trademarks.
The fact that a design must be ornamental, new and non-obvious to
qualify for design patent protection does not disqualify the same
design for copyright or trademark protection.
Certainly the
qualitative standards of all these forms could be satisfied by the same
design. The subject matter exclusions would apply, as discussed
above, but if a design is “ornamental,” it may also be “nonfunctional”
in the trademark sense and “non-useful” in the copyright sense.
Potential overlap between copyright and trademark may be seen
with respect to two- and three-dimensional works that may have been
copyrighted as “pictorial,” “graphic,” or “sculptural” works and are
also distinctive of particular products or services in the trademark
sense. Neither § 102(b) of the Copyright Act nor functionality would
appear to separate adequately these two strong forms of protection.
Such two- or three-dimensional works (such as cartoon or comic book
characters) may readily be “original” in the copyright sense and also
be “inherently distinctive” (or have acquired secondary meaning) in
138
the trademark sense. This may be a matter of considerable concern

associated with the definition and application of the doctrine of functionality).
137. In TrafFix Device Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc., 530 U.S. 1260 (2000), the
Supreme Court held there was a presumption of functionality when a copied product
design was disclosed in expired utility patents, at least when claims of the expired patent
would be infringed by the copied design. The owner of the expired patents brought an
action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act against the copier of the design. The district court,
dismissed the claim under the doctrine of functionality. 971 F.Supp.262 (E.D.Mich.1997).
The Sixth Circuit reversed because the district court did not focus on the design as a whole
but focused on a particular element. 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir.1999).
138. For example, the Peanuts comic strip’s loveable dog character “Snoopy” was
registered as a word and design trademark on May 29, 1962, Reg. No. 732167, and has
been renewed since then. A copyright registration was originally obtained on January 12,
1968, original Reg. No. GP59162 in the Visual Arts Class with a Note: “Stuffed dog
resembling the Peanuts cartoon character Snoopy”. As this registration was under the
1909 Copyright Act, it had a term of 28 years renewable for another 28 years. However,
the Copyright Act of 1976 extended the renewal term to 67 years. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
Thus, as the Snoopy copyright was in its first term on January 1, 1978 (the effective date of
the Act), it was renewable at the end of 1996 (see 15 U.S.C. § 305), and a new registration
(RE753956) was issued on April 8, 1997. Thus, adding 67 years to 1996 would extend the
term until the end of 2063. But there is still the Sony Bono Extension Act. Under 17
U.S.C. § 304(b), a copyright still in its renewal term (which the Snoopy copyright was)
“shall have a copyright term of 95 years from the date the copyright was originally
secured. . .” As fate would have it, and unfortunately for Snoopy (and his heirs and
assigns), his copyright life is not extended, as the original copyright was in 1968 and thus
adding 95 years would still result in an expiration date of 2063.

48

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[25:1

when the copyright expires but the trademark is extant.139
What, then, are the consequences to the public/private domain
dichotomy with respect to these overlapping forms of protection?
Copyrights have a longer term than patents, and trademarks continue
until abandoned. Thus, the potential for extended protection arises
even though the shorter strong version may have terminated. A
longer strong version may still be extant, providing substantially
equivalent protection. This overlap thus keeps the particular creation
in the private domain with respect to the strong version that is extant,
while the same creation was made available for exploitation when the
strong version expired.
As discussed above, there are economic consequences to
extended protection.140 Whether these predicated adverse economic
consequences brought about by the overlapping nature of protection
are justifiable is debatable. Nonetheless, is there a violation of the
public domain in the sense of the public’s being deprived of
something? The answer, again, would seem to be no. The public is
entitled to exploit a creation only to the extent that no protection has
been granted. The fact that one strong version has been terminated
and hence has lost its exclusivity does not entitle the public to exploit
that same creation if it is protected by another and extant strong
version. The expiration of one of the federal titles of protection
cannot drag another extant title into the public domain.141 If a general
rule is suggested, it would be that the public may exploit any creation
in the public domain provided there is no extant form of protection
that would otherwise preclude this exploitation. For example, the
fact that a patent has expired, in theory, permits the public to exploit
the patent in a manner that otherwise would constitute infringement
of the patent claims. Nonetheless, this exploitation does not grant the
139. This could occur with respect to Snoopy because the trademark could be renewed
beyond the expiration date of the copyright based upon continuing use. This issue was
raised by Judge Nies concurring in In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1052 n6 (C.C.P.A
1982) (authorizing the registration as trademarks of the two-dimensional depiction of the
three-dimensional toy dolls representing the comic book characters Superman, Batman
and Joker), where she observed: “[I]f a copyright doll design is also a trademark for itself,
there is a question whether the quid pro quo for the protection granted under the
copyright statute has been given, if, upon the expiration of the copyright, the design
cannot be used at all by others. Whether there should be a temporary, permanent, or no
loss of trademark protection at that time must await resolution in an appropriate case and
I merely note the problem. At least during the term of copyright here, if any, I find no
reason to deny trademark rights.”
140. See supra nn.114-117 and associated text.
141. The expiration of a lease on Blackacre would not terminate the separate grant of
an easement to cross Blackacre.
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public the right to exploit the creation in the manner that would
infringe an extant copyright or trademark covering the same creation.
Stated another way, the expiration of a patent privileges the public to
exploit the invention in a manner that would otherwise constitute
patent infringement, and the patent owner has no right to exclude this
exploitation. If there is an extant copyright or trademark, however,
this privilege does not extend to the infringement of these separate
titles of protection. Copyright and trademark owners still have the
statutory right to enforce these titles of intellectual property to the
exclusion of the public within the bounds of the scope of protection
afforded under the particular title of protection. Consider a real
property example: the transfer of title to Blackacre by its owner to
the village, to be added to the common, does not grant public access
to Blackacre if it is still subject to existing leases. Thus, the fact that
one title of intellectual property protection no longer protects a
creation does not automatically cast that creation into the strong
version of the public domain if that creation remains protected by
142
another strong version of intellectual property.

VI. The Unprotectables
Even within the seemingly ever-expanding definition of
protectable subject matter under the various titles in the strong
versions of intellectual property protection, there still remains certain
subject matter that is protectable only by the weak version of secrecy.
Strong protection is denied such matter, even though its acquisition
through the creative cognitive process may have required the
expenditure of considerable talent, motivation, labor, and resources,
it would meet a high qualitative standard, and proves to be extremely
valuable to society. The public disclosure of such unprotectables thus
redounds to the benefit of the public domain not only in the weak
sense of stimuli but also in the strong sense of exploitability.
All titles of protection have their absolute exclusions from
protection. The absolute exclusion of certain subject matter by
copyright and trademark law seems in deference to patent law. Thus,
§102(b) of the Copyright Act excludes ideas, processes, etc., from the
§102(a) recitation of statutory subject matter. Also excluded are
useful works. Trademark law excludes protection of functional

142. This is, of course, with the presumption that the extant strong version of
intellectual property is not invalid. If a trademark is found functional because it is
disclosed as such in a patent, this would invalidate the trademark. But the same would be
true if the functionality we based upon a journal article rather than a patent.
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marks.
Aside from secrecy, the last resort for certain subject matter
would seem to fall to patent law. Even with the broad interpretation
adopted by the Supreme Court for patentable subject matter as being
“anything under the sun made by man,”143 the Court holds that
certain subject matter, generally categorized as: (i)” laws of nature,”
(ii) “natural phenomena,” and (iii) “abstract ideas”, does not
constitute patentable subject matter and thus should fall from the
private domain (weak version) to the public domain (strong version)
with the loss of secrecy.144 Thus, regardless of how much the public
disclosure of such subject matter may advance “Science and the
useful Arts,” no reward in terms of a government grant of exclusivity
is available.145 The logical consequence of this would be the loss of
incentive on the part of even highly talented and motivated
individuals to expend labor and resources in the pursuit of such
subject matter. Some justification would seem to be in order for the
failure to protect natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas solely in the weak form of secrecy, which hardly seems to be in
the public interest. This would be especially true at the present time
of unparalleled technological advancements and with a high level of
protection being provided not only to such advancements but also to
the seemingly trivial.146 Presumably, protecting these categories of
“unprotectables” would satisfy the instrumentalist goals of the
Constitution. We may start this inquiry by a definitional question of

143. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“The Committee Reports
accompanying the 1952 act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to
‘include anything under the sun this is made by man.’ (Sen. Rep .No. 1979,) 82d Cong. 2d
Sess, 5; (H. Rep. No. 1923,) 82 Cong., 2d Sess.,6 (1952).”
144. These exclusions based on prior case law are restated in Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at
309, after the “anything under the sun” standard : “This is not to suggest that § 101 has no
limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas have been held not patentable.” The Court cites: Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How.63, 112-121 (1854); Le
Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175(1853).
145. Rewards in the form of government grants or awards may, of course, be available,
as well as privately funded grants, awards, prizes, etc.
146. See William C. Smith, Patent This!, ABA J., 48, 51 (2001) (citing U.S. Patent No.
5,965,809 – ”method of bra size determination by direct measurement of the breast”; U.S.
Patent No. 5,443,036 – ”method for inducing cats to exercise [by flashing a laser beam] on
the floor”; U.S. Patent No. 5,616, 089 – method of [golf] putting; U.S. Patent No. 5,993,336
– tennis stroke employing kneepads.) One of my favorites is “bird diapers” (“Pampers for
parrots”) (U.S. Patent No. 5,934,226). One of Ann Landers’ all time favorites is the
musical condom (U.S. Patent No. 5,163,447). See Ann Landers, Inventor had his way down
south in ‘Dixie,’ Chicago Trib. (Apr. 26, 2001) Tempo, at 3.
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whether any of these categories satisfy the constitutional requirement
that only “inventors” may be granted exclusive rights for limited
times to their “discoveries.” In the parallel construction of the
Copyright/Patent Clause, the common sense interpretation would be
to equate the “discoveries” with “inventions” created by “inventors”
as “writings” are respectively the creations of “authors”. This is what
the Patent Act does with its unenlightening definition of invention:
“The term ‘invention’ means invention or discovery.”147 The Supreme
Court also appears to treat the terms invention and discovery
synonymously, provided the invention (discovery) qualifies as being
“made” by a human. Hence, if a “made discovery” is an “invention,”
can it be said that laws of nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas
can satisfy this requirement?
A positive answer is certainly
problematic with respect to laws of nature and natural phenomena
that cannot be said to be made by humans, but rather are seen as
being “discovered” in the sense that they exist prior to human
cognition of them. Here the verb “discover” is used and should be
distinguished from the noun “discoveries” of the Constitution and
“discovery” of the Patent Act. The dictionary definition of the verb
form is: “1: to make known or visible. . .2: to obtain sight or
knowledge of for the first time. . .”148 The obtaining of “knowledge for
the first time” appears particularly apropos of laws of nature and
natural phenomena.
Laws of nature would fall within the categorization of “eternal
law”:
The eternal law is nothing else than God’s wise plan for
directing every movement and action in creation. . . .
Those who know more than others know the eternal law
better. We can know the hidden things of God by looking
at the things that he has made, but no one fully
comprehends the eternal law, because its effects do not
fully reveal it.149

147. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2003).
148. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 321 (10th ed., 1997 ).
149. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia ch.9, 284 (Timothy McDermott, trans. &
ed. 1989). As interpreted by Dimoch: “It is sufficient for those who do not accept the
theological underpinnings of Aquinas’ view, to think of eternal laws as comprising all
those scientific (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.) ‘laws’ by which the
universe is ordered.” Susan Dimoch, The Natural Law Theory of St Thomas Aquinas, in
Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman, The Philosophy of Law 19, 22 (6th ed. 2000). As defined
in
the
Encyclopedia
Britannica,
at
<www.britannica.com/eb/
article?eu=564288tocid=0>: “Laws of nature are of two basic forms: (1) a law is universal
if it states that some conditions, so far as are known, invariably are found together with
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In essence, these laws specify how the physical universe works.
They are universal and ubiquitous and apply to everyone and
everything without consent to be bound. Such laws may be universal,
i.e., they apply in all circumstances, or as qualified by particular
circumstances, but still applying universally within those defined
boundaries. Newtonian mechanics work quite universally, except at
particle levels and speeds approaching that of light. In any event,
universal physical laws are or should be scientifically verifiable to
qualify in this sense.
Laws of nature are operative, of course, whether or not anyone
has yet conceived them (i.e., knows about them). In this sense, they
pre-exist knowledge by anyone and their articulation awaits the
creative cognition process of stimulus, to perception, to conception
and knowledge. The law of gravity certainly was used, relied upon
and applied prior to Newton’s monumental discovery and
publication. The Supreme Court in Charkrabarty categorically denies
protection to such physical laws: “Einstein could not patent his
2
celebrated law that E=mc ; nor could Newton have patented the law
150
of gravity.” These are classic examples of the pre-existant being
151
discovered compared to being invented by human intervention.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court made it quite clear that, while
laws of nature per se are not patentable subject matter, their
application as embodied to traditional categories of inventions
(processes, machine, manufacture, composition of matter) is
patentable. Thus, an incentive, at least to this extent, is provided: The
discoverer has the first crack at patenting applications of the
discovered law of nature. It may be that a “head start” may provide
an adequate incentive to satisfy the instrumentalist goal of the

certain other conditions; and (2) a law is probabilistic if it affirms that, on the average, a
stated fraction of cases displaying a given condition will display a certain other condition
as well. In either case, a law may be valid even though it obtains only under special
circumstances or as a convenient approximation. Moreover, a law of nature has no logical
necessity; rather, it rests directly or indirectly upon the evidence of experience.”
150. Diamond v. Charkrabarty, 447 U.S 303, 309 (1980), (quoting from Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S.127, 130 (1948), which was quoted again in
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1980)).
151. The pre-existence of a scientific principle was affirmed in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. 62, 112-121 (1853) (invalidating Moore’s broad claim covering any use of
electromagnetism for telegraphic purposes) and reaffirmed in Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S.584, 591-592 (1978) (in the context of a computer-controlled method for updating an
alarm limit in a catalytic converter): “Whether the algorithm was in fact known or
unknown at the time of the claimed inventions as one of the “basic tools of scientific and
technological work,” see Gottschalk v. Benson, supra n. 133 at 67, it is treated as though it
were a familiar part of the prior art.
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Copyright/Patent Clause.
In short, the instrumentalist goal of the Constitution may be
satisfied without granting exclusivity to the discoverer of laws of
nature without the adverse consequences of denying access to these
fundamental laws to others, even if such denial is even possible.
Other rewards, however, may be quite justified in order to encourage
fundamental research, including grants, awards, etc., particularly in
cases where such an investigation would not otherwise be undertaken
because of the need to expend a great deal of time and resources.
The next category of unprotectables, phenomena of nature,
would encompass “phenomenon” (using the dictionary definition):
“an object or aspect known through the senses rather than by thought
or intuition”152 as qualified by “nature” or “natural” to indicate
tangibility in the real world.153 There is a major difference between
such phenomena and laws of nature and abstract ideas. These
phenomena are physical as opposed to intellectual or ideal (except in
some Platonic sense). Phenomena, like laws of nature, pre-exist their
discovery and hence are not made by humans. In Chakrabarty, the
Supreme Court gave examples: “A new mineral discovered in the
earth or a plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.”154
The mineral and the plant existed prior to their discovery, but in
addition they are tangibles rather than intangibles, as are laws of
nature.155 They existed in the physical world as opposed to the
intellectual world, except perhaps in the sense that someone may
have formed the idea that such a mineral or plant should exist based
upon a particular theory or other evidence.156
The physical nature of these phenomena renders their
protection, other than as tangible property, well-nigh impossible
without the subjection of the tangible to the intangible. Should the
discoverer of a previously unknown plant be granted exclusivity over
that particular plant including the exclusion of the real property
owner and, additionally, exclusivity over that species of plant
wherever located? From a propriety standpoint, the principal
152. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 872 (10th ed., 1997 ).
153. An apple is a natural phenomenon; an apple pie is not; the law of gravity is not.
154. 447 U.S. at 309 (1980).
155. In other words, you can put your hands on, or take pictures of, a newly
discovered plant or insect. It will be named and categorized and hence distinguishable
from other plants or insects by physically identifiable characteristics, which will define the
archetype of that discovery.
156. This would often seem to be the case in nuclear physics, e.g. the neutrino particle
was theoretically predicted in 1930 but was not detected until 1956. See Columbia Encl.
854 (5th ed., 1993).
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intellectual content would seem to be the potential uses of the natural
phenomenon, even though a great deal of time and resources may be
expended in its discovery independent of its use.157
What also may be intended to be included are the intangible
qualities of physical phenomena as stated in Funk Brothers Seed Co.:
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature free
to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a
heretofore undiscovered phenomenon of nature has no claim to
monopoly of it which the law recognizes.158 .
Although there appears to be somewhat of a conflation of the
independent concepts of laws of nature and phenomena of nature, it
does appear clear that protection per se of qualities of particular
things is impermissible if these qualities are inherent in the thing
itself. In any event, it is the thing per se or its qualities per se that is
critical rather than what it may be used for, because first uses of
newly discovered phenomena certainly are patentable, as are new
uses of presently known phenomena.159
As mentioned above, protecting natural phenomena per se by a
strong version of intellectual property would introduce serious
conflicts with other property rights. Moreover, there seems little
justification for protecting phenomena per se on instrumentalist
grounds. An adequate incentive outside of exclusivity of the
phenomenon itself, would be afforded by protecting first or new uses
of the discovered phenomena. That such an incentive is quite
adequate is witnessed by the world-wide search being undertaken by
pharmaceutical companies for the medicinal qualities of various
plants and folk remedies.160 In addition, the weak version of secrecy
157. This is not to say that the mere discovery and study of physical phenomena may
not have significant scientific importance from a theoretical perspective, e.g. Darwin’s
theory of evolution.
158. 333 U.S. 127, 129 (1948).
159. See 35 U.S.C § 100(b): “The term ‘process’ means process, art or method and
includes a new use of a known process, machine manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.” See also Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S.176 (1980)
(sustaining a patent on a process for using a known but previously “useless” chemical
composition).
160. This is indeed big business. See Gecile Gulerin, Out of the Forest and Into the
Bottle, Unesco Courier, May 1, 2000, at 30: “An estimated two-thirds of the drugs sold in
pharmacies are of natural origin. They account for some $ 30 billion in sales every year.”
Some developing countries have labeled this quest by industrialized counties as
“biopiracy” and would like to share in the profits from the discoveries. The Convention of
Biological Diversity adopted in 1992 as part of the United Nations Conference on
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provides the discoverer with a head start in finding uses for the
discovered phenomena. This advantage in itself may provide a morethan-adequate incentive for expending resources on the search for
such phenomena.
The final category of unprotectables listed in Diehr is “abstract
ideas.” No definition is provided by the Supreme Court, except for
the dictum in Rubbertip Pencil Co. v. Howard: “An idea of itself is
not patentable . . .”161 Presumably the Court is attempting to make a
distinction between abstract and concrete ideas. If an idea is reduced
to practice in the patent sense to qualify as a process, machine,
manufacturer or composition of matter, it should thereby qualify, at
least, for patent protection. This is made clear in Rubbertip itself
where the Court in the complete sentence states: “An idea of itself is
not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically
useful is. The idea of this patentee was a good one, but his device to
give it effect, though useful was not new.”162
It may be that the Supreme Court was using “abstract idea” in
the intangible sense, i.e. a conception, to distinguish it from the
tangible implementation of the idea (the “creation” as used above),
which may, of course, be protectable subject matter. If such is the
case, then the question becomes whether or not abstract ideas that
have not been (or even cannot be) reduced to a tangible state should
be protectable in a strong form – if not by patent, then by another
strong form of protection.
As defined by Locke: “Idea is the object of thinking.”163 If
abstract ideas were protected, the scope of protection presumably
would correspond to the level of abstractness–the more abstract the
broader the scope. Conversely, the more abstract an idea is, the less
useful it is likely to be in the commercial sense. If the idea takes the
form of a hypothesis and is scientifically verifiable and verified, it
Environment and Development deals with a wide variety of issues arising from the
exploitation of the natural environment for economic gain. The Convention has yet to be
ratified by the United States. See Anthony Failo, Amazon Cash Crop; Brazil Seek
‘Bioroyalties’ From Western Drug Firms, Wash. Post, July 9, 1999, §A, at A21. See
generally, Ketih Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (NotBrave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 Ind. .J. Global
Leg. Studies 11 (1998) (on the issue of biopiracy see articles cited at 17, n. 21 and 50,
n.123).
161. 20 Wal. 498, 507 (1874).
162. Id.
163. Locke, supra n. 14, at 121. He then goes on to define the sources of ideas: “All
ideas come from sensation or reflection.” Id. One dictionary definition of “idea” is “a
formulated thought or opinion.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 574 (10th ed.
1997).
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would then seem to quality as a law of nature.
Ideas, of course, are not limited to technological ones. They
range from profound to trivial and from the immensely valuable to
the worthless or dangerous. 164 Once made public, ideas would appear
to go permanently into the public domain. Long ago Thomas
Jefferson explicated the ephemeral nature of ideas:
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in
the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea,
the fugitive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of
natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable property. If
nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking
power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it
is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one,
and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an
idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening
mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from
one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition,
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all
space, without lessening their density in any point, and like
the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising
from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas
which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done,
according to the will and convenience of the society, without
165
claim or complaint from any body.
As with laws of nature and natural phenomena, abstract ideas
are inherently granted a weak version of protection. However, if a
strong version of protection is recognized, which would grant
exclusivity to the idea once it became public, serious concerns arise.
164. Even so-called “concrete” and “novel” ideas are afforded limited protection,
even in the weak version. See supra note 67.
165. VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson 180-181 (Washington ed. 1813), quoted in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n2 (1966).
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For example, suppose that the abstract idea is superconductivity, i.e.,
transmission of electricity with very little energy loss due to resistance
in the conducting medium.166 If superconductivity is eliminated from
the pool of available ideas, the entire concept has been appropriated.
Indeed, the first conceiver of superconductivity has contributed little
beyond the intellectual construct itself of “wouldn’t it be nice if. . .”
But if the idea is made more concrete by the creative process, e.g., a
process for producing superconductivity using a supercooled
conducting medium, and there is sufficient concreteness in its
tangible reduction to practice (actual or constructive) to enable the
replication of this machine or process by one “skilled in the art,”
appropriation may be justified under patent law.167 However, if the
abstract idea of superconductivity were protected in a strong version,
it would be an infringement to exploit the more specific idea of the
supercooled process. Even though many may have benefitted from
the idea of superconductivity (at least, in the sense of stimulating
efforts to implement the idea), protecting the broad concept, which
had not been reduced to practice, would undermine the incentive to
so implement it. On an instrumentalist basis, the value of the abstract
idea would have to be compared to the opportunities lost by those
who could or would otherwise be stimulated by the abstract idea, and
through the creative cognitive process transform it into an
invention.168
166. Superconductivity was first observed in the early twentieth century.
Superconductivity was achieved by cooling to levels approaching absolute zero, using
liquid helium. The problem was to find materials that would enter the superconductive
range at higher temperatures. Certain metals would become superconductors at
temperatures as high as -415 deg. F. In the 1980s, it was discovered that certain ceramics
could be made into superconductors at about -321 deg. F. using liquid nitrogen, which is
much cheaper to use than liquid helium. The problem here is the brittleness of ceramics,
which make it difficult to form them into wire. The latest reported development is the
discovery that a metallic compound, magnesium dibromide, will become superconductive
at -389 deg. F. See Guy Gugliotta, ‘Superconductor’ Gain Holds Promise of Energy
Efficency, Wash. Post (Feb.24, 2001), §A, at A2. The quest continues for a malleable
material that will become a superconductor at liquid nitrogen temperatures.
167. The verb “may” is used because the process must still satisfy the utility
requirement of patent law. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. As stated in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519, 534 (1966) : “The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an
invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to
this point—where specific benefit exists in currently available form–there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.”
168. Kitch has proposed a prospect theory of patent protection wherein protection
would be granted on a prospect basis analogous to mineral claims at an early state of
technological development. See Edmond W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J. L.& Econ. 265 (1977); however, it is another matter to extend this theory to
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In the instrumentalist sense, justifying the grant of exclusivity to
abstract ideas may have exactly the opposite effect that one would
hope. For example, the “Golden Rule” is an idea we would expect
(or at least hope) to be as widely used as possible. Conversely, a bad
idea (such as racial superiority) is one we would expect (or at least
hope for) its use to be eliminated. Thus, exclusivity works for bad
ideas (assuming the privatizer had the good sense to suppress them)
but not for good ideas of this sort. The same would be true with
respect to technologically based ideas. If protected, the good ones
would be under-exploited (e.g., superconductivity), while the bad
ones (e.g., perpetual motion machines) would have little consequence
except to keep people from wasting their time and money on them.
While we may bemoan the shortage of good ideas, there seems to be
no dearth of bad ones.
Accordingly, the refusal to protect abstract ideas (at least those
in a state of abstraction not reduceable to practice within the skill of
the art) seems justifiable along with laws of nature and natural
phenomena. An adequate incentive for the search for ideas would
seem to be the head start afforded by secrecy until the idea is
implemented in tangible form. Human ingenuity and inquisitiveness
also provide natural incentives. In sum, one would hope that good
ideas would seek fruition in their implementation for the benefit of
society, while the bad ones, upon being made public, would at least
serve the public interest of identifying approaches to avoid and
169
Bad
subject them to the scrutiny of the “marketplace of ideas.”
the abstract-idea stage of development.
169. Consider some examples of elegant words by distinguished jurists. Justice
Holmes dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919),: “To allow
opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man
says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result,
or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that
time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It
is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager
our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.” The marketplace
was not quite as competitive as interpreted by Justice Holmes shortly before Abrams. See
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y.1943): “The newspaper] industry serves one of the most vital of all general
interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many
different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not
the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
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ideas as well as good serve the stimulus function of the public domain.
If anything should be available to all from the exploitable strong
version of the public domain, it is abstract ideas. The grant of
exclusivity by the government would hardly be justifiable under the
Copyright/Patent Clause and, more importantly, it would seem,
incompatible with the First Amendment.170

VII. Conclusion
If the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis, premised on instrumental
(quid of reward for quo of disclosure) legal theory and Kantian
philosophy buttressed by the neurobiological foundation of cognition,
provides any insights into the function of the public domain in the
intellectual property system, it would suggest as a general proposition
that the stimulus value of ideas and creations be enhanced within the
intellectual property system.
This would include two subpropositions: (i) that incentives for maintaining secrecy be limited and
(ii) that disincentives for creative utilization of protected subject
matter be limited.
With respect to limiting secrecy, the most promising place to start
would seem to be trade secrets. However, trade secret protection

kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have
staked upon it our all.” Justice Powell in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974) (note omitted): “We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas.” The omitted note, id. n. 8: “As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his
first Inaugural Address: ‘If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union
or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.’”
170. Indeed, the inroads of intellectual property protection on First Amendment
freedoms have been a major concern of scholars. See, e. g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting
Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 99 (2000); Benkler, supra n. 13; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Iintellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J.
147 (1998); Gordon, supra n. 3; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to
Information Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent Into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual
Property, 1992 S. Ct. Rev. 195; Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38
Emory L.J. 393 (1989); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional
Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Lionel S. Sobel,
Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 Copyright L. Symp. 43
(1971); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970);
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1180-86 (1970). See also Burk, supra, at 112
n.85 (citing articles discussing whether there should be a First Amendment right to
research).

60

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[25:1

seems here to stay.171 Licensing trade secrets shares their stimulus
value with others, which may lead to further creation. It is not
entirely clear that even forcing potentially patentable trade secrets
into the patent system under preemption would significantly increase
disclosure.172 Inventions (particularly processes) not easily subject to
reverse engineering are likely to be kept secret, especially now, when
patent applications will be published 18 months from filing.173 The
trade secret holder always risks loss of secrecy by legitimate reverse
engineering, laxity in maintaining secrecy, and misappropriation.
Trademarks are inherently public and offer whatever stimulus
value they have in their commercial use. Little incentive is provided
to warehouse marks in secrecy with the advent of intent-to-use
procedures.174
This leaves constitutionally based intellectual property–
copyrights and patents. In this context, adequate incentives would
generally appear to be offered for eschewing secrecy for statutory
protection. The problem for the public-domain-as-stimuli thesis is
not the adequacy of the incentive to disclose but that the scope of
exclusivity granted may significantly diminish the stimulus value to
others of these protected creations. Thus, the importance of the
second sub-proposition: that enforcing an excessively broad scope of
protection to copyrights and patents may be detrimental to creativity
by denying full access to the stimulus value of the protected creation.
If at least part of the consideration for the grant of protection is
to foster further creation (by transformation, improvement, etc.) by
permitting access to the protected creation, then that access should be
of such a scope as not to interfere significantly with the creative
175
process. The doctrines of fair use in copyright law and experimental
171. See Kewanee, supra n. 2, (discussed nn. 2, 21, 124-125 and text accompanying n.
21).
172. Compare Schaffner, supra n. 15 (making a strong argument in favor of federal
preemption).
173. See supra nn. 100-102 and associated text (discussing recent amendments to
Patent Act).
174. See supra nn. 7 and 77 (discussing intent-to-use application procedures).
175. Fair use originated as a court-made doctrine that was codified in the Copyright
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107:
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
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use176 in patent law, as currently applied, are considered by a number
of scholars as providing inadequate safeguards to those creative
individuals seeking access to protected creations for further
investigation.177 By the means of infringement actions, or even the
threat of such actions, further creativity may be retarded, to the likely
detriment to the public.
A variety of elegant solutions have been offered to expand the
fair use and experimental use “exceptions” or “exemptions”178 from
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.
176. Experimental use is a court-made doctrine. Justice Story is often quoted: “It
could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed
such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining
the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.” Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F.
Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). See also Sawin v. Guild, F.Cas. 554
(CCD Mass 1813) (No.12,391). The Patent Act was amended to preclude generic drug
producers from infringement with respect to previously approved drugs for uses solely
related to regulatory purposes. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1). See Janice M. Mueller, No
“Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 25-31 (2001) (discussing the background
of this amendment and its limitations).
177. With respect to fair use, see, e.g.: Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:
A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum.
L. Rev. 1600 (1982) (a seminal article introducing the idea of “market failure” into fair
use analysis); William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege In Copyright Law (1985) (collecting
cases uses the fair use factors); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on Fair Use
Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137 (1990); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair
Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661 (1988); John Cirace, When Does Complete Copying
of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale constitute Fair Use? An
Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 St. Louis L.J.
647 (1984); Lange & Anderson, supra n. 4 (proposing a presumption of fair use in favor of
all transformative works, not merely parodies).
With respect to experimental use, see, e.g.: Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress
of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017 (1989) (a
seminal article proposing a structure for expanding the experimental use privilege); Rai &
Eisenberg, supra n. 4; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998); Maureen
A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177
(2000) (modifying the § 107 fair use factors in the context of patents); Mueller, supra n.
178 (proposing a “development” use model); cf. Note, Experimental Use as Patent
Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 Yale L.J. 2169 (1991).
178. Mueller, supra note 176, at 17 n. 80, prefers the term “exemption” over
“exception” considering the latter to be “more precise.” The Copyright Act of 1976 (17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (2000) avoids the use of either term making § 106 (granting exclusive
rights) subject to §§ 107-121. The title of § 107 is “Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair
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infringement, primarily in the context of transformative works and
scientific research.179 These solutions all have merit and offer
significant instrumental, policy-based justifications for their adoption.
Further justification, in my view, is provided by the public-domain-asstimuli thesis, because the creative process is a complex one; without
access to protected works, which, after all, are presumably of high
stimulus value, further creation may be significantly hampered. This
is not the place to critique the various solutions offered or to provide
one of my own. What I might hope to add here is some clarification
in terminology and an analogy to tort law as an approach to
resolution of the conflict of property rights versus access for
continued creativity.
First, with respect to terminology, if Hohfeldian definitions are
Use.” Fair use under § 107 is then defined as “not an infringement of copyright.” I would
prefer to use the term “privilege” as defined by Hohfeld (see supra n. 63) because this
usage makes clear that there is no tortuous conduct (infringement) when fair or
experimental use applies. This usage is consistent with that of Benkler, supra n. 13. See
also Patry, supra n. 177.
179. See, e.g.: Gordon, supra n. 3 at 1614: “Fair use should be awarded to the
defendant in a copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present; (2)
transfer of the use to the defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would
not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner”; see also
Eisenberg, supra n.4 at 1078: “In sum, I make the following recommendations concerning
the proper scope of an experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability: (1)
Research use of a patented invention to check the adequacy of the specification and the
validity of the patent holder’s claims about the invention should be exempt from
infringement liability. (2) Research use of a patented invention with a primary or
significant market among research users should not be exempt from infringement liability
when the research user is an ordinary consumer of the patented invention. (3) A patent
holder should not be entitled to enjoin the use of a patented invention in subsequent
research in the field of the invention, which could potentially lead to improvements in the
patented technology or to the development of alternative means of achieving the same
purpose. However, it might be appropriate in some cases to award a reasonable royalty
after the fact to be sure that the patent holder receives an adequate return on the initial
investment in developing the patented invention.
O’Rourke, supra n. 177, at 1205 (identifying five factors relevant to a fair use finding in
patent law): (i) the nature of the advance represented by the infringement; (ii) the purpose
of the infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure that prevents a
license from being concluded; (iv) the impact of the use on the patentee’s incentives and
overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented work. Mueller, supra n. 178, at
66: A potential solution is a “liability rule” model that permits the non-consensual
“development use” of research tools not readily available for licensing or purchase, while
providing an ex post royalty payment to the patent owner that would be correlated to the
commercial value of the new product developed from the non-consensual use. This
“reach-through” royalty approach provides the best approximation of the true worth of
the research tool to its user. It ensures a royalty award of sufficient amount to maintain
incentives for the development and patenting of new research tools, yet alleviates the
access restrictions and up-front costs currently associated with acquisition and use of many
proprietary research tools.
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used: The owner of an exclusive right (copyright or patent) has a
“right” to exclude infringers of that right, who have a correlative
“duty” not to infringe.180 However, a situation may exist or be created
that would change the legal relationship between the owner and the
infringer to one where the owner has “no-right” to exclude the other,
who may be said to have a correlative “privilege.”181 The most
common example would be where the owner grants a license to one
who would otherwise be an infringer. The grant of license changes
the legal relationship to a “no-right” in the owner and a “privilege” in
the licensee. By entering into the consensual relationship, that which
would have been a tort (infringement) is non-tortious, permissible
behavior on the part of the privileged licensee. The legal relationship,
in certain circumstances, may be transformed from right—duty to noright–privilege without the consent of the parties. An example from
the law of torts may illustrate this.
In the well known case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
182
the master of the steamship Reynolds, owned by defendant,
Co.,
acted reasonably in not departing from plaintiffs’ dock into a storm
on Lake Erie. During the storm, lines were replaced as needed to
hold the vessel securely to the dock, and, as a consequence, plaintiffs’
dock was damaged. Technically, defendant was a trespasser on
plaintiff’s property once the Reynolds had been unloaded. The court
held that while “the defendant prudently and advisedly availed itself
of plaintiff’s property for the purpose of preserving its own more
valuable property, . . . plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for
injury done.”183 In Hohfedian terms, defendant was privileged to
trespass based upon the circumstance of the private necessity, but this
was a qualified privilege limited to inflicting no damage. If any
damage was caused, defendant had a duty to compensate the
plaintiffs whose property right had been violated. To extend this
reasoning by analogy to the present tension between property rights
under copyright and patents and potentially privileged uses, I would
suggest that in “qualifying circumstances”, those who otherwise
would be infringers be granted a qualified privilege, limited as in
Vincent to not causing any damage. The infringement (trespass)

180. See Corbin, supra n. 65 (defining the terms “right” and “duty”).
181. Id. (defining the terms “privilege” and “no-right”).
182. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W.221 (1910), reprinted in edited form in Victor E.
Schwartz et al., Prosser, Wade & Schwartz’s Torts Cases & Materials 120 (10th ed. 2000);
Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 52 (7th ed.2000); Dan D. Dobbs & Paul
T. Hayden, Torts and Compensation 100 (4th ed.2001).
183. 109 Minn. at 460, 124 N.W. at 222.
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would be privileged, but the right owner would be compensated if
damaged. I would rely upon the stimulating work of others, as set out
in the margin, for defining “qualifying circumstances” and “damages”
in this context.184
Another approach would be to employ “liability” rules rather
than “property” rules with respect to “qualifying circumstances.” 185
However, due to the current dominance of property theory, whether
qualified or not by “intellectual,” Hohfeldian legal analysis may be a
more judicious approach. 186
Finally, and returning to the title theme, I would suggest that if,
there is a tragedy lurking in the present intellectual property system,
it is not so much secrecy as the unduly narrow access to protected
creations. I would also offer that there is a counterbalancing comedic
aspect to whatever protection secrecy could provide, for we are in an
age of unprecedented stimulation. Our senses are constantly being
assaulted by stimuli from sources undreamed of in the time of Kant,
Newton, or even Einstein. This sensory overload may even have an
adverse impact on creativity by lowering our sensitivity to the unique
in the maze of an unrelenting barrage of mostly noise.187 Let us hope
that we are capable of filtering out the bad ideas and being
stimulated by the good ones.

184. See supra n. 177 (indicating some of the proposals that have been made).
185. The classic article is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092
(1972): “An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that some who wishes
to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from his in voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller . . . Whenever someone
may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value
for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.” See also J.H.Reichman, Of Green
Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 Vand. L.
Rev. 17, 43 (2000) (use of liability rules with respect to follow-on innovations).
186. See Boyle, supra n. 5, at 43: “The literature on governing the commons promises
to be exceptionally useful here, as does the oft neglected tradition of Hohfeldian legal
analysis; each can offer a different kind of clarity.” Compare Lessig, supra n. 4, at 189:
“For these ideas take for granted the property in intellectual property; these ideas have
lost the distinction that our framers made clear—by speaking as they did, not of
intellectual property, but of monopolies and exclusive rights. That’s what a copyright or
patent is — a government backed monopoly, not over a rivalrous or scarce resource like
land or apples or heated homes, but over a nonrivalrous resource that the enlightenment
taught us should be shared among more than the church. IP is not P, but this truth is lost
on us.”
187. See supra n. 36 (discussing how the mind deals with excessive sensory
stimulation). Indeed, as put by Dennett: “It is the glory of science that it can find the
patterns in spite of the noise.” Daniel C. Dennet, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution
and the Meaning of Life 358 (1995), quoted in Analytic Jurisprudence Anthology 50
(Anthony D’Amato ed. 1996).

